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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING

*

AND HEATING,

*

Priority No. 15

*

No. 20020495-SC

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

*
*
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
*
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation, *
Defendants/Appellants
*

Trial Court Case:
940300014CN

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§78-2-2(5), 78-2a-4, and Utah R. App. P. Rules 3,4,45-51.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE: With respect to the Utah mechanics' lien statutes (specifically §38-1-18
U.C.A. and the term "successful party" as employed therein), did the court of appeals exceed
its authority when it failed to apply the law already established by the Utah Supreme Court but
instead, in the guise of interpreting the term "successful party," created a completely new
framework and definition which not only ignores the mandatory "shalf'language of §38-1 -18
U.C.A. but substitutes in place of this Court's prior decisions their "flexible approach" or
"prevailing party" analysis as set forth in Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale. 782 P.2d 551
(Utah App. 1989)?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The interpretation of a statute poses a question of law
which this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's
conclusions." Zoll and Branch, P.C v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997). The
Appellants (homeowner and builder) believe the foregoing issue primarily challenges the trial
court's conclusions of law to which an appellate court would accord no particular deference, but
review for correctness. "[WJhether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law,
which we review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); Soft
Solutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000).
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED:

Defendants'

Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney Fees
filed November 2,1999, Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17,2000, Record
2050.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE
Utah Code §38-1-18:
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76;
Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the amended judgment (on

remand from the court of appeals) of the trial court, which denied Whipple's (plumbing

2

subcontractor's) claim for foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien.1 The trial court entered
a judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00, but declined to award the homeowner
and builder their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the lien
foreclosure action, which fees they had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW:

After four and one-half days of trial, Judge Noel ordered foreclosure of Whipple's
mechanics' lien and awarded $23,779.33, in damages (inclusive of $7,500.00 attorney fees
awarded per §38-1-18 U.C.A.; $3,966.82 interest -from August 1,1993 to March 15,1997; and
$3,470.90 costs of suit.) (Judgment f 3 dated March 7,1997, recorded in Book XX pages 311316. -Addendum 3)
On appeal (first appeal) by the homeowner and builder, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court in part and entered an order remanding the matter to the trial court for disposition
consistent with its opinion. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction.
977 P.2d 518,527 (Utah App. 1999) cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). After remand,
the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to submit
memoranda as to the issues remanded to the trial court by the court of appeals. The trial court
held a hearing on November 10, 1999, at which time Judge Noel heard arguments and took
evidence (by way of affidavit) as to the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the parties. On
January 20,2000, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues Record 2022. After the hearing, the trial court denied Whipple's claim for foreclosure of the
1

See Addendum " 1 " - Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien filed September 14,1993.
3

$30,647.20 mechanics1 lien, and entered a judgment in favor of the homeowner and builder
against Whipple for $527.00. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of
foreclosure of its mechanics' lien, the trial court declined to award the homeowner and builder
their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure
action, which they had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A. In September 2000, Whipple's
attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order
of Foreclosure as directed by the trial court in the Memorandum Decision dated January 20,
2000. The trial court signed the amended pleadings which were filed with the clerk of the court
on October 18,2000. On November 17,2000, the homeowner and builder timely filed a Notice
of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to award them their reasonable attorney fees
incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure action filed by Whipple.
On March 14, 2002, the court of appeals entered its decision upholding the trial court.
On May 6, 2002, the court of appeals entered an order denying the homeowner and builder's
Petition for Rehearing (based upon misapprehension of a material fact). Homeowner and builder
subsequently sought certiorari, which this Court granted.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

For purposes of this appeal, the homeowner and

builder respectfully submit the following as being relevant for this appeal:
1. The trial occurred over 4 Vi days -- October 11-12, and November 28, 29, and 30,
1995, during which time the court took evidence of the work which Whipple claimed to have
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provided to the three (3) separate properties.2 Whipple sought lien recovery identifying 11
separate claims:3
Reference
1. Sewer laterals
2. Thomas Guy pool house
3. Diane Quinn sump pump
4. Municipal water line re-location
5. French drains 77 Thaynes
6. Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr.
7. Pool house miscellaneous
8. Diane Quinn gas line
9. 77 Thaynes house plumbing
10. 77 Thaynes house heating
11. 77 Thaynes house gas piping
Total Jobs
Payments
Principal Balance Due

Amount
$10,200.00
$ 1,665.92
$ 1,100.00
$ 6,660.80
$ 3,162.05
$ 780.00
$
65.00
$ 631.00
$13,358.00
$12,265.50
$ 1,015.00
$50,968.27
$17,000.00
$33,968.27

Property
Thaynes
Pool house
Quinn
Thaynes
Thaynes
Thaynes
Pool house
Quinn
Thaynes
Thaynes
Thaynes
Thaynes

(Exhibit 12 included as Addendum 2.)

2

The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are
referenced hereinafter for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; (2) the
Tom Guy pool house lien; and (3) the Thaynes Canyon property lien.
3

Whipple's claims related to the Thaynes property are summarized as follows:
Reference
Amount
Laterals (sewer)
$10,200.00
Municipal water line re-location
$ 6,660.80
French drains
$ 3,162.05
Backhoe
$ 780.00
Plumbing
$13,358.00
Heating
$12,265.50
Gas piping
$ 1,015.00
Gross Claim
$47,641.35
Less Payments
<$17,000.00>
Net Claim
$30,64135
5

2. Whipple was a licenced plumbing contractor but an unlicenced HVAC (Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning) contractor. At the outset of the litigation, homeowner and
builder filed a Motion to Dismiss the HVAC portion of the mechanics' lien claim which Judge
Brian granted. However, during the trial Judge Noel allowed Whipple to introduce evidence as
to the HVAC claim and eventually allowed Whipple to recover for such on an "equitable basis."
(Judge Brian's Pretrial Ruling of May 8, 1995 (Record 113) and Judge Noel's Trial Minute Entry
(Record 262)).
3. A timely appeal was filed which was transferred to the court of appeals.
4. On March 18,1999, the court of appeals entered an opinion (first appeal) remanding
this matter to the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its opinion stating:
1f 31 The Utah mechanics1 lien statute provides "in any action brought to enforce
any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs
in the action." Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1997). In this case, although the trial
court initially granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure, it went on to award Whipple
the value of the work performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this
finding, the trial court concluded that Whipple was the prevailing party and
entitled to an award of attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be erroneous
in light of our determination that section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from
recovering for its HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record, it appears
the HVAC claim was the single most important issue in this case and Aspen,
having fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to
prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If on remand the trial court
determines Aspen is the prevailing party under section 38-1-18, then Aspen must
be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney fees incurred in
pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a
redetermination of the attorneyfees award consistent with this opinion and
the entry of findings necessary to support the revised award. [Emphasis

6

supplied by the Appellants.] (p. 525) A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating
v. Aspen Const. 977P.2d518, cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
A more complete summary of the underlying facts are set forth fully in A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const.. 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999) cert, denied, 994P.2d
1271 (Utah 1999). (Addendum 5) Shortly after the remand, the trial court held a telephone
conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues
identified by the court of appeals for resolution by the trial court. (Telephone conference with
Judge Noel held September 13,1999.)
5. On November 2,1999, the homeowner and builder submitted their Memorandum of
Law and an Affidavit in Support of Attorneys Fees which detailed the dates the work was
performed, the hourly rate, the time spent, and described in detail the nature of the services
performed. Additionally, the affidavit allocated the fees between the required three categories:
(1) the successful claims for which there may have been entitlement to fees; (2) the unsuccessful
claims for which there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been successful; and (3)
the claims for which there would be no entitlement to attorney fees. (Defendants' Attorney's
Affidavit-Record 1975)
6. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The court
heard arguments and took evidence from the homeowner and builder's attorney as to the
reasonable attorney fees incurred by the homeowner and builder. Whipple's attorney argued
at the hearing that he could not allocate the fees between the requisite three categories, but after
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the hearing submitted his affidavit supporting his claim for attorney fees. (Record 2062,
Transcript of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 10, 1999; Letter and Affidavit of
Plaintiffs Attorney filed November 12, 1999 — two days following the hearing; see also
Defendants' Objection to the late submission filed November 17,1999.)
7. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to the
remaining issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of the
$30,647.20 mechanics1 lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00.
(Record 2022)

The initial appeal and subsequent remand involved three (3) separate lien

foreclosure matters which were consolidated for trial. The trial court held for Whipple on the
other two (2) lien foreclosure matters, determined the lien amounts ($631.00 and $1,666.00
respectively), found Whipple to be the "successful party" with respect to those liens, determined
$2,500.00 to be the reasonable attorney fees related to each of those lien foreclosure matters
($5,000.00 total), and entered orders foreclosing those two parcels of property respectively.
(Record 2022) (Those judgments of foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by
Aspen.)
8. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its $30,647.20
mechanics' lien with respect to the Thaynes Canyon property, the trial court declined to award
the homeowner and builder their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending
against the foreclosure, which they had requested pursuant to §3 8-1 -18 U.C. A. (Record 2022)
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9. In September 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's January 20,
2000, Memorandum Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial court and were later
entered by the clerk on October 18, 2000. (Record 2029)

On November 17, 2000, the

homeowner and builder filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to
award them their attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure
proceeding. No cross appeal wasfiledby Whipple. (Record 2050)
10. In March of 2002 the court of appeals upheld the trial court and on May 6, 2002,
denied the homeowner and builder's Petition for Rehearing. (The opinion on the second appeal
of the court of appeals is attached hereto as addendum 6.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals exceeded its authority when it failed to apply the clear precedent
established by the Utah Supreme Court. §38-1-18 U.C. A contains a legislative mandate that
the "successful party" in a lien foreclosure action be awarded their reasonable attorney fees
to be taxed as cost in the action. Prior to the court of appeals' decision in this case, the legal
definition of a "successful party" in the context of a mechanics' lien case was simple,
definite and certain. "A successfulparty includes one who successfully enforces or defends
against a lien action." Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297,300-01,452 P.2d 325,
327-28 (1969). The court of appeals' decision in this case not only ignores this Court's
9

decisions but effectively overturns years of precedent and creates a completely new legal
framework for determining when to award attorney fees in mechanics' lien cases, i.e., a
"flexible approach." It effectively nullifies the mandatory "shall" wording employed by the
legislature in §3 8-1 -18 U.C. A. and rewrites the statute to provide that the "prevailing party"
"may" be entitled to their reasonable attorney fees incurred in defeating a lien claim
depending upon how the trial courts apply the "flexible approach" standard they are now
instructed to employ. This is contrary to canons of statutory construction which presumes
the proper legislative construction had already been made by this Court if the statute is
amended and the language employed by the legislature does not change. The historical
certainty surrounding this issue has prevented extended litigation as to whether one was a
successful mechanics' lien claimant or one successfully defeated the mechanics' lien, as the
two positions were mutually exclusive. The court of appeals' decision ignores the legal
principle of stare decisis and removes this certainty which will ultimately create more
litigation regarding attorney fees.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

Legal Analysis: Prior to the court of appeals' decision in this case, the legal

definition of who was a successful party in a mechanics' lien case was definite and certain.
"A successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends against a lien
action." Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297,300-01,452 P.2d 325,327-28 (1969).
A "successful party" was simply that; it was the party who successfully enforced or
defended against a lien action. ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile. 998 P.2d 254 (Utah
2000)

(Homebuilder's lien foreclosure case was dismissed at early stages of litigation;

appeal ensued. Utah Supreme Court determined that homeowners who successfully
defended lien foreclosure action were entitled to attorney fees, including attorney fees
incurred upon appeal.); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co., 714
P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) (Trial court ruled in favor of labor and materials provider in lien
foreclosure action. Purchaser of property appealed, and lien claimant's judgment of
foreclosure was set aside in ruling by the Utah Supreme Court. Whereas lien claimant was
originally awarded attorney fees by trial court, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that property
purchaser was now entitled to attorney fees as the successful party.); Duckett v. Olsen, 699
P.2d 734 (Utah 1985) (Contractor successfully foreclosed on lien. Trial court awarded
attorney fees to contractor as the successful party; bank appealed ruling. Utah Supreme
Court affirmed trial court.); Duggerv.Cox, 564 P.2d 300 (Utah 1977) (Party who improved
property as per contract, but was not compensated, successfully foreclosed on lien. Utah
Supreme Court affirmed trial court upon appeal and awarded attorney fees to party who
11

improved the property, the successful party.); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy
Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982) (Attorney fees award of $34,000.00 against lien
claimants who were unsuccessful in obtaining lien foreclosure sustained on appeal.);
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969). ("A
successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends against a lien action.");
and Brimwood Homes. Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply Co.. 385 P.2d 982 (Utah 1963)
(Materialman filed lien to protect his interest in compensation from builder. Builder
responded with suit to void materialman's claim to lien, tendering "receipt and lien release"
as evidence of the invalidity of materialman's lien. Utah Supreme Court validated
materialman's lien and awarded him attorney fees as the successful party in the action.)
Historically, the concept of a successful party (as opposed to a prevailing party
standard) was one that was mutually exclusive. One was a successful party by either
enforcing a mechanics' lien (if you were the mechanics' lien claimant), or preventing a
mechanics' lien from being enforced (if you were the party against whom the mechanics'
lien claim was being brought).
By holding that the terms "prevailing party" and "successful party" are synonymous,
the court of appeals overturns years of precedent of this Court and interjects into the process
a great deal of uncertainty.4 The court of appeals' new "flexible approach" framework will
4

This statement is not merely subjective conjecture by the homeowner and builder's
attorney. It is also the conclusion reached by the editors at West. See case summaries at
West Headnotes 7 and 8. (Addendum 6)
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prove particularly troublesome in cases where there are claims, counterclaims and/or crossclaims. The trial courts will be forced to weigh each of the party's respective claims to
determine who, if anyone, is entitled to "prevailing party" status. In some cases this may not
prove difficult; however, in other cases the application of a prevailing party "flexible
approach" standard may prove difficult and time consuming. See for example Footnotes 7 12 and the problematic analysis of the court of appeals in Mountain States Broad. Co. v.
Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555-58 (Utah App. 1989):
Footnote 7: The determination of a "prevailing party" becomes even more
complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties, see Pioneer
Roofing Co. v. Mardian Constr. Co., 152 Ariz. 455, 733 P.2d 652 (Ct.
App. 1986); the granting of non-monetary relief to one or more parties, see
Watson Constr. Co. v. AmfacMortgage Corp., 124 Ariz. 570, 606 P.2d 421,
435-36 (Ct. App. 1979); Food Pantry, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc.,
58 Haw. 606, 575 P.2d 869, 879 (1978); and where the ultimate award of
money damages does not adequately represent the actual success of the parties
under the peculiar posture of the case. See Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R.
Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,313-14 (Alaska 1972). These cases demonstrate the
need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who
actually is the "prevailing party."

II.

Legislative Presumptions and Prior Judicial Constructions: The court of

appeals' decision ignores the legislative mandate which states in pertinent part: " . . . the
successful party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees . . . "

In the guise of

interpreting the terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" as being synonymous, the
court of appeals effectively rewrites §38-1-18 U.C.A., substituting in place of this Court's
past interpretations their "flexible approach" legal analysis. This is not only contrary to the
principle of stare decisis but is in contravention of the judicial canon of statutory
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construction that "where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions
unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the legislature is presumed to have been
satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have
adopted them as consistent with its own intent." Rocky Mountain Helicopter, Inc. v. Carter,
652 P.2d 893, 896 (Utah 1982) citing Christensen and State Insurance Fund v. Industrial
Commission and Morrison, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. was
amended in 1961 and 1995. Each time the term "successful party" was retained by the
legislature. The court of appeals5 decision lacks proper judicial restraint and completely
disregards not only the legislative mandate but also the precedence of this Court's prior
decisions and the well-established canon of statutory construction that this Court's prior
judicial construction of the term "successful party" were already consistent with the
legislative intent of the statute.
III.

Public Policy: From a public policy position the historical certainty

surrounding this issue has significantly discouraged extended litigation as to whether one
was a successful party. It is respectfully submitted that this policy i.e., to stand by precedent
and not to disturb settled points of law, is precisely what stare decisis is intended to
accomplish. The court of appeals' decision in this case removes this certainty, which will
create extensively more (and in many instances unnecessary) litigation regarding attorney
fees. Attorneys representing parties to a mechanics' lien dispute will now be required to
creatively posture their clients as the "prevailing party" under the new "flexible" approach
to try to persuade the trial court they are the prevailing party. This in turn will force the trial
14

courts to hold hearings and make detailed findings with respect to each aspect of the claims
and counterclaims in order to ascertain which of the parties was the "prevailing party" in
order to determine who is entitled to "successful party" status. The Utah Supreme Court
should exercise its power of supervision and reverse the court of appeals.
IV.

Legal Analysis as Applied to the Facts of This Case: There is little dispute that

the legal and factual issues surrounding the lien foreclosure of the Thaynes Canyon property
were the primary focus of both parties' efforts expended at trial. The court of appeals
acknowledged this in ^[31 of the opinion in the first appeal. (Addendum 5) Whipple, a
licensed plumbing contractor, but an unlicenced HVAC contractor, asserted that he could
legally claim and foreclose a $30,647.20 mechanics lien for both plumbing and HVAC work.
See Addendum 1 (Notice of Claim of Lien) and Addendum 2 (Whipple's trial exhibit #12 —
Summary of Whipple's lien claims).

Although the HVAC claim was the single most

important issue in the case, it was not the only issue on which the homeowner and builder
were successful. In addition to defending against Whipple's HVAC claim, the homeowner
and builder successfully defended against Whipple's claim for labor and equipment in
installing french drains ($3,162.05), relocating a municipal water line ($6,660.80), and
backhoe rental ($780.00.) The homeowner and builder also successfully prevailed on their
counterclaim that the HVAC system was defective. The trial court granted the homeowner
and builder a $7,000.00 offset for deficiencies it found in the HVAC system as well as a
$2,000.00 offset to finish the plumbing work. All these issues arose during the trial in
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addition to the licencing issue the homeowner and builder prevailed upon during the first
appeal.5
The trial court erred when it held that these issues were not "inextricably related" to
the overall defense of Whipple's lien claim.

When the trial court entered a monetary

judgment against Whipple (effectually denying the $30,647.20 lien claim) the homeowner
and builder attained "successful party" status as a matter of law; the trial court's refusal to
grant them their reasonable attorneys fees related to defeating Whipple' s lien claim was error
as a matter of law. The trial court's award of attorney fees to Whipple on the two
mechanics' lien cases in which it succeeded to obtain lien foreclosure, and denial to the
homeowner and builder on the mechanics' lien claim they successfully defended, is not only
logically but legally inconsistent and mandates reversal and remand to another trial judge for
5

At trial Whipple vigorously pursued its $30,647.20 lien claim. Whipple's trial
exhibit #12 (Addendum 2) plainly shows that Whipple sought (after the application of the
$17.000payments made by Aspen) approximately $30,641.35 plus the costs of filing the
Notice of Claim of Lien, interest and attorney fees. Whipple's lien claim against the
Thaynes Canyon property was composed of the following items and amounts:
Item Claimed - 77 Thaynes Canyon
Laterals (sewer)
Municipal water line re-location
French drains
Backhoe
Plumbing
Heating
Gas piping
Gross Claim
Less Payments
Net Claim
(Source: trial exhibit 12 - Addendum 2)
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Amount
$ 10,200.00
$ 6,660.80
$ 3,162.05
$ 780.00
$13,358.00
$12,265.50
$ 1,015,00
$47,641.35
<$17.000.00>
$30.641.35

a fair and impartial determination of the reasonable attorney fees they incurred in defending
against Whipple's $30,647.20 mechanics' lien, including fees and costs related to all
appeals.
A.

Evidentiary Basis.

Prior to the hearing, the homeowner and builder's attorney submitted his affidavit
which was prepared to comply with the requirements articulated by the Utah Supreme Court
in Foote v.Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). Citing the Foote v. Clark decision in f 32 (first
appeal), the court of appeals stated the following:
The party must differentiate between the fees and time expended for "(1)
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there
is no entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d
266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This requirement also obligates the trial court to
make findings which closely resemble the requesting party's allocation of fees
on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. Finally, the trial court must clearly
identify and document the factors it considered dispositive in calculating the
award. See id. Absent such an allocation and documentation, this court
cannot adequately review the trial court's decision. See id. at 57.
Based upon the foregoing standard, the homeowner and builder's attorney made the
following allocations of the attorney fees they had incurred through trial and the appeal:
Category 1:
Category 2:
Category 3:
Total Fees Incurred:

$30,902.89
4,531.00
1.000.00
$36.433.89

(See Affidavit of Defendants' counsel paragraphs 5 & 6 filed November 2,1999 - Record
1975.)
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The inclusion of the majority of the fees in Category 1 was due exclusively to the fact
that the defense of Whipple's $30,647.20 mechanics' lien claim (comprised of several
different components — see Addendum 2) required proof of and counter proofs on the
several claims raised by Whipple: (1) proof by the homeowner and builder as to whether the
HVAC system was defective and therefore added no value to the property; (2) whether
Whipple's lack of an HVAC license estopped him from being able to pursue foreclosure as
a matter of law; and (3) whether Aspen owed Whipple for services it had not contracted or
requested regarding the installation of french drains, the relocation of the municipal water
line, and payment for the use of a backhoe left by Whipple at the construction site.
Generally a mechanics' lien claimant must prove that he has enhanced the value of
the property; conversely, if the homeowner and builder could prove the HVAC system was
deficient, then the lien claimant could not have enhanced the property. At trial, the
homeowner and builder were successful in convincing the trial court that at least $7,000.00
of repairs were needed to remedy the deficient HVAC installation as well as a $2,000 offset
for the unfinished plumbing work (See Record 262). By successfully prosecuting the appeal
on the HVAC issue (which the court of appeals observed was the "single most important
issue in the case") the homeowner and builder completely defeated the lien claim.
However, the trial court appears to have lost sight of the fact that the homeowner and
builder prevailed not only on the HVAC issue but several other disputed issues.
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B.

Trial Court's Analysis.

The primary issue on remand to the trial court was: In light of the court of appeals'
disposition of Whipple's HVAC claim, whether the homeowner and builder were now the
"successful party" in the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property, and
if so what were the reasonable attorney fees they had incurred in defending against the lien
foreclosure action.
Following the hearing, the trial court found Whipple to be the successful party with
respect to the mechanics' lien on the Diane Quinn property as well as the mechanics' lien
on the Tom Guy pool house property, and awarded $5,000.00 attorney fees to Whipple in
connection with those two lien foreclosure matters — as to which no appeal or cross appeal
has been taken. Regarding the lien filed against the Thaynes Canyon property, the trial court
determined Whipple was not entitled to foreclose the $30,647,20 lien claim, but that
homeowner and builder were entitled to a monetary judgment against Whipple in the amount
of $527.00. The homeowner and builder respectfully submit that the denial of the right to
foreclose the mechanics' lien resulted, as a matter of law, in them being the "successful
party" as to the foreclosure action filed against the Thaynes Canyon property.
Notwithstanding, the trial court declined to award the homeowner and builder any attorney
fees setting forth in the Memorandum Decision two reasons: 1) The homeowner and builder
had just barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon
property; and 2) The homeowner and builder "prevailed on an essentially legal issue."
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A review of the trial court's decision after the trial (Record 262) discloses that with
respect to the Thaynes Canyon property, the homeowner and builder were successful on the
following issues:
$6,660.80 - Relocation of the Park City water line for which Whipple
sought and was denied recovery of $6,660.80. Compare Plaintiffs
Exhibit 12 with trial court's decision. (Record 262)
$3,162.05 - French drains. Whipple sought and was denied recovery
of $3,162.05 for installation of french drains. Compare Plaintiffs
Exhibit 12 with trial court's decision. (Record 262)
$680.00 - Backhoe rental. Whipple sought recovery of $780.00.
Whipple was only granted relief for $100.00. Compare Plaintiffs
Exhibit 12 with trial court's decision. (Record 262)
$2,000.00 - Offset for finish work related to plumbing contract.
Whipple sought $13,358.00, but recovered only $11,358.00. (Record
262)
$7,000.00 - Offset for deficiencies in the HVAC system. Whipple
contended there were no offsets due because there were no
deficiencies. The trial court granted the homeowner and builder an
offset of $7,000.00 due to the deficiencies found by the trial court in
the HVAC system. (Record 262)
$12,265.00 - HVAC contract. Whipple sought and was denied
recovery of $12,265.50 for the HVAC system. Compare Plaintiffs
Exhibit 12 and trial court's original decision (Record 262) with result
required by application of the court of appeals' decision on the first
appeal.

1.

'The Homeowner and Builder Did Not Just Barely Prevail" The first reason

articulated by the trial court was that the homeowner and builder had just barely prevailed.
The trial court in explaining its reasoning stated the following:
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It is important to the Court to note however that defendant [sic]
is such only by the amount of $527.00. The Court feels where
Plaintiff was claiming roughly $ 13,000.00 [sic] on the Thayne's
Canyon property (allowing for the $17,000.00 already paid),
and where Defendant was claiming $25,000.00 in damages for
the negligence of the plaintiff, and further where the net
recovery is only $527.00, the Court is of the opinion that this is
essentially a "draw" and no attorney's fees should be awarded.
The Appellate Courts in our state have acknowledged that the
"net recovery rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be
applied strictly under circumstances.
The trial court's reference to $13,000.00 as the amount of damages which Whipple
sought is a grossly incorrect statement of Whipple's 11 item lien claim and is totally devoid
of any support in the record. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence that
Whipple was seeking, net of the $ 17,000.00 paid by Aspen, an additional $30,641.35. This
is perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the appeal. Both the trial court and the court of
appeals have refused to simply pull out a calculator and perform some basic arithmetic.
$13,000.00 was not the net amount Whipple was pursuing in the Thaynes lien foreclosure
action. (See Footnote 4 above and Addendums 1 and 2.) Both lower courts ignored the
mathematics involved, erroneously seized upon the $13,000.00 figure, and have refused to
acknowledge the error even when it has been respectfully raised.
In paragraph 20 (second opinion) the court of appeals recited that Whipple sought
".. .roughly $13,000.00 (allowing for the $17,000.00 already paid..."). This is simply not
accurate. How the court of appeals became confused on this issue is perplexing, particularly
in light of the fact that addendums 1 and 2 were attached to the briefs and any attempt to
perform the simple math involved clearly refutes such. A Petition for Rehearing was filed
21

and trial exhibit #12 (addendum 2) and the mechanics' lien (addendum 1) were again
referenced in order to clear up any and all question that Whipple was seeking, net of the
$17,000.00 already paid by Aspen, approximately $30,000.00 - $31,000.00 - not
$13.000.00. (See Footnote 5 above.) Notwithstanding, the court of appeals failed to correct
this in its opinion. As an attorney, one is accustomed to helping a client reconcile losing a
case when the courts make an informed decision based on the facts itfinds,but not mistaken,
misunderstood, or misapprehended facts. Where a court refuses to correct a clear factual
misapprehension, it appears that the court is selectively utilizing the facts it needs to bolster
a position that was reached not on the facts or merits of the particular case, but on those facts
the author needs to logically support the result he or she wishes to reach. It is extremely
frustrating to the client, but more importantly, reflects very poorly upon the judicial system
itself, when the parties to a dispute put thousands of dollars of effort into trying to present
the dispute to a court for a fair resolution. When both the trial court and the court of appeals
misapprehends a key fact, such as the difference between $13,000.00 ($30,000.00 $ 17,000.00) and $30,000.00 ($47,000.00 - $ 17,000.00), and refuse to acknowledge the error,
let alone correct the error, the public confidence on which the judicial system operates is
shaken if not entirely lost.
Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien contained a demand for $30,647.20 plus costs of
filing. During trial, Whipple vigorously pursued the lien claim which was comprised of the
following items and amounts: Sewer laterals $10,200.00; Municipal water line relocation
$6,660.80; French drains $ 3,162.05; Backhoe rental $780.00; Plumbing $13,358.00;
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Heating $12,265.50; Gas piping $1,015.00; Gross Claim $47,641.35 less payments
$17,000.00; Net Claim $30,641.35. See Addendums " 1 " and "2."
But even if for sake of argument Whipple was only seeking $13,000.00, the court of
appeals' decision is still wrong. It still misapplies the legal standard under which this Court
has historically determined which party in a lien foreclosure action is the "successful party."
In essence, the trial court held that defeating a mechanics' lien claim by only a small amount
is not enough to allow the homeowner and builder to claim successful party status. This is
error. The homeowner and builder defeated Whipple's mechanics' lien. It is respectfully
submitted that the trial court incorrectly applied the law. Had the homeowner and builder
failed to recover any sum but still prevented Whipple from obtaining an order allowing
foreclosure of the mechanics* lien, they would, pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A., be the
"successful party" and ergo, entitled to their reasonable attorneys 'fees in obtaining this
result This is what the legislature intended and what the statute requires.
An examination of the case law regarding what constitutes a "successful party"
reveals the application of a simple two-part test: First, the courts look to the complaint in
the underlying action. If the complaint (or a counterclaim arising out of the underlying
action) involves the enforcement of a mechanics' lien, then reasonable attorneys' fees shall
be awarded to the party who was successful. Second, "success" is determined solely by
whether or not the party asserting the right to enforce the lien was successful. You either are
or are not successful in obtaining lien foreclosure. The concept is one that is mutually
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exclusive. Petty Inv. Co. v. Miller. 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978); Palombi v. D & C Builders.
22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969); Rottav.HawL 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988).
Application of the correct legal standard in this case clearly mandates a conclusion,
as a matter of law, that the homeowner and builder were the "successful party" as to the
$30,647.20 lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property.
2.

The Homeowner and Builder Did Not Merely Prevail on a "Legal Issue."

The trial court went on to explain an additional reason as to why it was denying any
attorney fees:
Moreover, the Court thinks there is an additional reason to
award no fees. The only reason that the defendant received a
net recovery, is because it prevailed on an essentially legal
issue, that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors
license prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis for
the installation of the HVAC This issue was clearly distinct
and separate from the defendants negligence claim. The Court
does not feel that they are "inextricably tied together" as urged
by the defendant [sic]. Had the defendant [sic] not prevailed on
this legal issue concerning the plaintiffs Licensure, then
plaintiff would have obtained a net recovery of approximately
$8,646.00. The Court therefore is of the opinion that the
defendant [sic] should have allocated attorney fees to the
mechanics lien claim of plaintiff and the time expended
litigating the Licensure issues but has failed to do so.
Without attempting to degrade the trial court's reasoning, the homeowner and builder
respectfully submit that the trial court's reasoning does not give proper effect to the specific
instructions of the court of appeals (first appeal) and demeans the homeowner and builder's
status as a successful party because they prevailed merely on a "legal issue" (evidently as
opposed to an "equitable" or "moral" issue). The trial court's observation that "had the
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defendant [sic] not prevailed on this legal issue. . ." Whipple would have recovered
$8,646.00, while mathematically correct, misapplies the legal standard enacted by the
legislature. On its face, §38-1-18 U.C. A. does not distinguish between the methodology one
utilizes to attain successful party status. Instead, the legal determination that reasonable
attorney fees shall be awarded is based solely on whether one is or is not successful in
relationship with the lien foreclosure claim.

The trial court's analysis leads it to the

incorrect result because it fails to fully analyze the entirety of the $30,647.20 lien claim
made by Whipple. The trial court appears to have focused instead on just the $13,000.00
plumbing claim as opposed to the $30,647.20 in claims it asserted in the Notice of Lien
against the Thaynes Canyon property.
More importantly, it ignores the fact that it was Whipple's conscious decision to
pursue the HVAC claim as part of its mechanics' lien even though Whipple lacked the
proper HVAC license. Whipple's decision to pursue the HVAC claim is what engendered
the significant attorney fees in this case. As noted by the court of appeals in the first opinion
(addendum 5) at the outset of the proceedings, Judge Pat Brian granted the homeowner and
builder's motion to dismiss Whipple's lien claim as to the HVAC work because Whipple
lacked the proper licensure status. (Record 113) However at trial, over counsel's objection,
Judge Noel allowed Whipple to introduce evidence of the value of the HVAC work and
Judge Noel ultimately awarded on an "equitable basis" Whipple's HVAC claim. It was only
after incurring significant attorney fees and costs, not only at trial but also on appeal, that the
homeowner and builder were able to prevent Whipple from obtaining foreclosure on the
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Thaynes Canyon lien claims. Whipple consciously decided to pursue the HVAC claim even
though his lack of licensure caused the homeowner and builder damages which were
eventually offset against the lien claim. After trial, the homeowner and builder were forced
to appeal and were vindicated when the court of appeals reversed Judge Noel as to the
HVAC claim. Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. was enacted specifically as a remedy for this type of
case. To deny the homeowner and builder their reasonable attorney fees after defeating
Whipple's lien claim eviscerates §38-1-18 U.C.A. and renders the language "the successful
party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees" virtually meaningless. At least
that is the result in this case.
In this context, one can see the fallacy of the trial court's logic. As a matter of law,
the homeowner and builder were the "successful party" in the litigation surrounding the
Thaynes Canyon property, and they are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. The issues
surrounding the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property, including
Whipple's licensure status, were "inextricably tied together."
This legal principal was discussed in First General Services v. Perkins. 918 P.2d 480
(Utah App. 1996) and reaffirmed in Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, (Utah
App. 1999). In Brown, the court of appeals stated the following:
f 19 We have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees
may not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of
the compensable and non-compensable claims overlapped. For example, in
First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), a
subcontractor sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien against a homeowner, and
the homeowner counterclaimed alleging negligent workmanship. See id. at
483. The subcontractor prevailed and sought recovery of its fees incurred in
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both the foreclosure of its lien and defense to the homeowner's counterclaim.
See id. The trial court awarded fees on the foreclosure claim, but refused to
award fees under the mechanics' lien statute for defense against the
homeowner's counterclaim. See id.
T[ 20 On appeal, we reversed, holding that the subcontractor was entitled to
fees both in pursuing its affirmative claims and defending against the
counterclaim because the two were inextricably tied together. See id. at 486.
In so holding, we recognized that where the proof of a compensable claim and
otherwise non-compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the
same facts, a successful party is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving
all of the related facts. See id.
Like the First General Services case, the fees incurred by the homeowner and builder
were incurred by the homeowner and builder in pursuing its affirmative claims and
defending against the lien foreclosure claim; and like the situation in First General Services,
the "successful party" should not be denied the right to recover their reasonable attorney fees
because the two were inextricably tied together.

The homeowner and builder would

respectfully request that the Supreme Court reverse the trial court and instruct the trial court
to grant them their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in all appeals. "An appeal
from a suit brought to enforce a [mechanics'] lien qualifies as part of 'an action' for the
purposeofsection38-l-18." J.V. Hatch Const.. Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8,15(UtahApp.
1998) citing Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993).
Note: Richards, supra was cited with approval in Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890,
895 (Utah 1996).6
6

See also footnote 7 at page 196 American Rural Cellular. Inc. v. Systems Comm.
Corp.. 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) which states:
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CONCLUSION
The appellate courts of this state are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring legal
accuracy and uniformity of the laws of this state. Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah
1997). The homeowner and builder respectfully submit that the trial court's decision which
denied them an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defeating Whipple's lien
was clear error. Homeowner and builder were the "successful party" on the mechanics1 lien
claim made by Whipple against the Thaynes Canyon property, and they are statutorily
entitled to be awarded their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection therewith. §381-18 U.C.A. The case should be remanded to the trial court with orders to conduct an
evidentiary hearing as to what fees and costs were incurred below and on all appeals to
obtain this result with respect to the Thaynes Canyon litigation. Given that this is Judge

FN7. Although, as Cellcom suggests, there may not technically have been any
prevailing or successful party in the prior appeal, in determining who is
entitled to attorney fees under section 38-1-18, we look to which party was
ultimately successful. See Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc., 660
So.2d 623,627 (Fla. 1995). This court did not decide the merits of any claims
in the prior appeal, and thus it could not be determined who was the successful
party for purposes of the mechanics' lien statute until the trial court made its
ruling on remand and until this appeal was resolved.
Moreover, Syscorn was forced to defend in the prior appeal to "enforce" its
liens, and thus Syscom is entitled to its attorney fees incurred in defending its
lien claims on appeal. Cf. First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486
(Utah.Ct.App. 1996) (holding "the successful defense of counterclaims which
would otherwise defeat the principal lien claim, in whole or in part, must
necessarily be considered for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the
mechanics1 lien statute").
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Noel's second ruling which the homeowner and builder have had to appeal, they would
respectfully request the matter be remanded to another judge.
The trial court's denial of attorney fees was error. It compounded this error when it
ignored the multiple claims on which the homeowner and builder had been successful, and
focused solely on the "legal issue" on which it was reversed by the court of appeals. It
compounded this error when it ruled that the issues involved in defending Whipple's
$30,647.20 lien claim and the defenses and offsets were not inextricably tied to each other.
The trial court and court of appeals' reasons for denying the homeowner and builder's
request for their reasonable attorney fees, because they merely prevailed on a "legal issue,"
or because they only prevailed by $527.00, failed to apply the correct legal standard.
Throughout the trial and on appeal, the homeowner and builder constantly challenged
Whipple's ability to assert a lien against the Thaynes Canyon property and did so for several
reasons. Whipple was not successful in obtaining foreclosure of the mechanics' lien;
nonetheless, Whipple caused the homeowner and builder to incur substantial fees defending
against its mechanics' lien for which a remedy under Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. is mandated.
When Whipple failed to obtain an order of foreclosure on its $30,647.20 lien claim, it
subjected itself to the foregoing legislative provision which the trial court was obligated to
follow.
It is immaterial by what amount the homeowner and builder prevailed. The core
inquiry is simply whether Whipple was successful in pursuing its lien claim. Whipple was
not successful. Conversely, the homeowner and builder were successful in preventing the
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foreclosure of Whipple's $30,647.20 lien. As a consequence of Whipple's failure to obtain
an order allowing foreclosure of the claimed lien, the homeowner and builder, as the
successful party, are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. §38-1-18 U.C.A. The trial
court and court of appeals have effectively disregarded the legislature's unequivocal
mandate in this area, as well as the historical precedent of this Court. This Court should not
disregard the legislative mandate of §38-1-18 U.C.A.
The Utah Supreme Court should reverse and remand the case with instructions to
award the homeowner and builder their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in
defending the Thaynes Canyon mechanics1 lien claim at trial as well as for all appeals.
Respectfully submitted this _/# day of December, 2002.
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A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING & KTG.
#47 SOUTH 1000 WEST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104
(801) 359-7141

BKU0751 PGGV&3-003<

ALAN SPRIGGSt SUflMT COUNTY RECORDER
1??3 SEP 14 11:30 AH FEE $10.00 BY I
REQUESTS iHTEfttlQUHTAlH LIEN SERVICES

NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN
"Mechanic's Lien"
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the undersigned acting as the duly authorized agent of A.K.& R. WHIPPLE
PLUMBING AND HEATING, "lien claimant". Said agent hereby gives
notice of the intention of said claimant to hold and claim a
mechanic's lien and right of claim against bond, by virtue and in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et. seq., and
14-1-13 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. That said
lien is against the property and improvements thereon owned or
reputed to be owned by THOMAS D. GUY. Said property is located at
77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, Summit County, Utah.
Parcel #TH8-1

Legal Description:

All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION #8, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the office of the Summit County
Recorder, Coalville City, Utah.
The lien claimant was employed by and did provide labor and/or
materials (H.V.A.C.) at the request of ASPEN CONSTRUCTION for the
benefit and improvement of said real property. That first labor or
materials were provided on April 27, 1993 and the last said labor
and/or materials were provided on August 1, 1993. That there is
due and owing to said claimant the sum of Thirty Thousand Six
Hundred Forty-seven dollars and Twenty cents ($30,647.20), together
with interest, costs of $100.00 and attorney fees, if applicable;
all for which the lien claimant holds and claims this lien.
INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES,
Agent for the Hew claimant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

On September 9, 1993, personally app3@red before me Anthony L.
Scarborough, doing business as INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the
Company that executed the above and foregoing instrument as agent
for the lien claimant, and that said instrument was signed in
behalf of said Company and that said Anthony L. Scarborough
acknowledged to me that said Company executed the same,
EN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixed my seal.
My Commission Expires:
August 9, 1997
NOTARY PUBLIC
KELLY CASSELL
My CwrwteknfopimiAug. 9,199; I
STArfcOFUTAH
WSiTfr*

iding in
Utah-

P.O. BOX 526065
Salt Lake City,
UT
84152-6065
(801) 486-6672 - Fax 466-2155
September 17, 1993
CERTIFIED

NO.

P 301 439 460

Thomas D. Guy
P.O. Box 680728
Park City, UT 84060
Re:

Lien Against: 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, UT
Lien Claimant: A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing, Salt Lake City, UT
Contracting Party: Aspen Construction, Salt Lake City, UT

Gentlemen/Ladies:
Please be advised, that the attached Mechanic's Lien has been filed
at the request of the aforesaid "Lien Claimant11 • The Lien is
intended to secure for the payment of work, equipment or materials
provided for the improvement of your property and establishes legal
rights granted to a contractor or supplier, pursuant to Utah State
Statutes.
This Mechanic's Lien will be released from the County Records upon
payment of all monies due to the claimant. If the obligation is
not paid, they reserve the right to take further action to enforce
their right of lien or claim against bond.
However, it is the claimants preference that litigation be avoided.
We believe that all parties would be best served if you would
prevail upon the contracting party to promptly satisfy this
account. Alternatively, you may wish to pay the claimant directly.
Your acknowledgement and future correspondence should be made
directly to the claimant. Please contact Kent Whipple of A.K.&R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating at (801) 359-7141, as all matters
regarding this debt are handled by them. Thank you.

enclosure
cc:

A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating
Aspen Construction
File

Tab 2

JOB ORDER
JOB DESCRIPTION

AMOUNTS

Laterals
Thomas Guy
Poolhouse
Diane Quiim Sump Pump
Municipal
Water
Re-location
French Drains
77
Thaynes
Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr.
Pool House
Miscellaneous
Diane Quinn Gas Line
77 Thaynes House
Plumbing
77 Thaynes House
Heating
77 Thaynes House Gas
Piping

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
ID

$50,968.27

TOTAL

1)
2)
3)

$10,
200.00
$
1,665.92
$
1,100.00
$
6,660.80
$
3,162.05
$
780.00
$
65.00
$
631.00
$13,358.00
$12,265.50
$
1,015.00

LEINS

AMOUNTS

77 Thaynes Canyon
Drive
Diane Quinn
Residence
Thomas Guy Pool
House

$30,647.20
$
631.00
$
1,695.92

TOTAL LIENS

$32,974.12

TOTAL JOBS
LESS PAYMENTS

$50,968.27

PRINCIPLE BALANCE DUE

$
$
$

7,000.00
7,000.00
3,000.00
$33,968.27

<

EXHIBIT

Tab 3

STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679
WALL & WALL, a.p.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8220
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,

:

JUDGMENT

!
:

Civil No. 94-03-00014 CN
(District Court)

Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

:

A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Plaintiff,

:
:

VS.

!:

DIANE M. QUINN and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation,

j:
s!
:

Defendants.
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Plaintiff,

:
j
:
:

vs.

:

THOMAS D. GUY and CLAIRE B.
GUY, husband and wife and
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation,

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

Circuit Court
Civil No. 94-0013 CV
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN

Circuit Court
Civil No. 94-0012 CV
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN

2
This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B.
Wall of WALL & WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Defendants were

present and represented by their attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. The Court having taken testimony
and evidence and having heard the parties' arguments and the Court
having entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and
having directed that judgment be entered in accordance therewith;
Now, therefore, by reason of the law and findings aforesaid:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Plaintiff have and recover judgment against

Defendant Aspen Construction in the sum of $10,943.00 with interest
thereon from August 1, 1993 until the date hereof at the rate of
ten (10)% per annum amounting to the sum of $3,966.82 through March
15, 1997 and for the sum of $3,467.90 as costs of suit including
filing

the Notice of Lien herein and

$7,500.00 as and for

attorney's fees incurred herein to be taxed as costs, for a total
sum of $25,877.72 together with Plaintiff's costs and additional
attorney's

fees incurred in preparing the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment amounting to the sum of $1,031.25
together with such costs and fees as may be incurred to satisfy
said judgment and that said total sum bear interest at the legal
rate of 7.45% per annum from the date hereof until paid.
2.

That the sum so due and owing to said Plaintiff is for

work and labor done and performed and for materials furnished upon,
&WALL(APC)
RNEYS AT LAW

in, and about the construction and impairment of the premises
hereinafter described; and that said premises and the interest of
the

respective Defendants

therein, are

junior, inferior

and

subordinate to the lien or liens of the Plaintiff for the amount of
lien or liens together with costs and attorney's fees as set forth
herein.
3.

That pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-1-5 Plaintiff's

lien has priority over any lien, interest, mortgage or other
encumbrances which may have been filed or which may have attached
subsequent to the time when first work began, or first material was
furnished by Plaintiff and hereinvolved; also over any interest,
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no
notice and which was unrecorded at the time work began, or first
materials furnished by Plaintiff on the subject land.
4.

That the interest of Defendant Quinn in the property more

particularly described below in this paragraph, be sold by the
Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed
by law, to satisfy the amount of Plaintiff's lien against said
property together with other expenses and costs adjudged herein to
be $11,170.88.
a.

5.

All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah,
situate in Summit County, Utah.

That the interest of Defendants Thomas Guy and Aspen

Construction, Inc. in the property more particularly described
below be sold by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in
the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy the amount of Plaintiff's
&WALL(APC)
)RNEYS AT LAW

lien against said property together with other expenses and costs
adjudged herein to be $23,779.33.
a.

6.

All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8
according to the official plat thereof as filed in
the Office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville
City, Utah, situate in Summit County, Utah.

That the interest of Defendants Thomas D. Guy, Claire B.

Guy and Aspen Construction in the property more particularly
described in this paragraph be sold by the Sheriff of Summit
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy
the amount of Plaintiff's lien against said property together with
other expenses and costs adjudged herein to be $12,576.93.
a.

All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER VALLEY,

according to the official plat thereof as filed in
the Office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville
City, Utah, situate in Summit County, Utah.
7.

Judgment for attorney's fees are taxed as costs and shall

be a joint and several liability to be satisfied in whole from the
sale of any of the aforementioned parcels of property or a
combination of any of said parcels of property.

However, at such

time as the total amount of the attorney's fee award ($7,500.00) is
recovered in the sale of one or more of the above described parcel
or parcels of land, then the sheriff shall discount the judgment
for the attorney's fee from any remaining parcel or parcels to be
sold.
8.

That after the time allowed for redemption has expired,

as specified in Utah Code Annotated §38-1-15 the Sheriff shall
execute a deed to the purchaser or purchasers of the respective
premises on said sale or sales.
&WALL(APC)
«NEYS AT LAW
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9.

That the proceeds of the respective sale or sales shall

be applied:
a.

To the payment of the sheriff's fees, disbursements,

and commissions on each respective sale;
b.

To the payment to Plaintiff of the total sum due for

principal, interest, and costs of suit, together with interest
thereon at 7.45% per annum from the date of this Judgment, all
as more fully set forth in Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this
Judgment.
10.

That if the proceeds of any sale be insufficient to pay

the amount so found to be due Plaintiff, with interest, costs,

and

expenses of sale, the Sheriff shall, in his return on the sale,
specify separately as to each property the amount of any such
deficiency, and on filing said return, the clerk of this court
shall docket a judgment in favor of Plaintiff for said deficiency
against Defendant Aspen Construction where a deficiency results.
Said judgment shall be in the amount of such deficiency, and
Plaintiff shall have execution therefor.
11.

That Defendants, and all persons claiming by, through or

under them, and all persons having liens subsequent and inferior to
Plaintiff's liens, and all persons claiming to have acquired any
estate or interest in said premises subsequent to Plaintiff's lien
shall

be

forever

barred

and

foreclosed

from

all

equity of

redemption in and to said premises, and every part and parcel
thereof, from and after the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff of
Summit County, Utah.
.&WALL(A.P.C)
)RNEYS AT LAW

day of March, 1997.

DATED this

BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOEL
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid

to Joseph M.

Chambers, Esq., PRESTON & CHAMBERS, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah
84321 on this

/

day of March, 1997,

Secretary to Steven B. Wall

L&WALL(A.PC)
ORNEYS AT LAW

STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679
WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8220
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Plaintiff,

!
!!
:
:

vs.

:

THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation,

;;
::
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 94-03-0014 CN
(District Court)

Defendants.
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DIANE M. QUINN and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS D. GUY and CLAIRE B.
GUY, husband and wife and
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants•

:
:
:
::
::
:

Circuit Court
Civil No. 94-0013 CV
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN

:
:
j
:
:
:
i:
::
:
:

Circuit Court
Civil No. 94-0012 CV
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN

This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B.
Wall of WALL & WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Defendant was

present and represented by its attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. The Court having taken testimony
and evidence and having hear the parties1 arguments and the Court
having entered its two Minute Entries (written ruling) the Court
now hereby enters its formal Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This case represents three consolidated

cases which

includes two Circuit Court matters which were consolidated with the
District Court matter for trial.
2.

That Plaintiff A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating

Incorporated was at all times material to the various causes of
action

enumerated

in this case a Utah corporation

with its

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
that at all times material to these causes Plaintiff was licensed
with the State of Utah as a general plumbing contractor.
3.

That

the

Defendant

Aspen

Construction

is

a

Utah

corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County and was at all times material to these causes licensed with
the State of Utah as a general building contractor with an
aggregate bid limit of $500,000.00.
4.
WALL { A P C )
MEYS AT LAW

That Defendants Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy are

individuals and residents of Summit County, State of Utah and fee
title owners of property situate in Summit County, Utah, identified
as follows:
All Of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER

VALLEY, according to the official plat
thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
This property is hereinafter referred to as the Guy Poolhouse
property.
5.

At all times material Defendant Thomas D. Guy was the fee

title owner of the property identified as follows:
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8
according to the official plat thereof as filed
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder,
Coalville City, Utah.
This property is hereinafter referred to as the Thaynes
Canyon property, situate in Summit County, Utah.
6.

That at all times material Defendant Diane M. Quinn was

an individual and resident of Summit County, State of Utah, and fee
title owner of the property identified as follows:
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the

official plat thereof as filed in the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
This property is hereinafter referred to as the Quinn
property, situate in Summit County, Utah.
7.

Sometime in the early part of 1993, the Plaintiff, by and

through its agent Bill Fenstermaker entered into various agreements
with Defendant Aspen Construction to perform work on the three
aforementioned properties.
WALUA.PC)
JEYS AT LAW

Those various contracts consisted of

the relocation of a Park City water line for the benefit of the
Thaynes Canyon property; the installation of a gas line at the
Quinn property; miscellaneous plumbing work at the Guy Poolhouse
property; installation of a forced air heating system at the
Thaynes Canyon property; the installation of a gas line at the
Thaynes Canyon property; the installation of the rough, sub-rough
and

finished

plumbing

at

the

Thaynes

Canyon

property;

the

installation of a hose bib at the Guy Poolhouse property; the
installation of sewer and water laterals from the street to the
curb at the Thaynes Canyon property and at 79 Thaynes Canyon and
the installation of the sewer and water lateral from the curb to
house at the Thaynes Canyon property.

Also, Defendant Aspen

Construction utilized a backhoe for work unrelated to any of the
aforementioned which had been rented by the Plaintiff and which was
located at the Thaynes Canyon property.
8.

That prior to the trial of this matter the Court ruled

Plaintiff could not recover under its contract with Defendant Aspen
Construction for the heating system installed at the Thaynes Canyon
property since it was not a licensed HVAC contractor however,
Plaintiff could recover for this system on an equitable basis and
be compensated for any benefit conferred upon the property by the
installation of said system less any deductions to complete the
installation and to correct any deficiencies in the system.
9.

That

pursuant

to

agreement

with

Defendant

Aspen

Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at the Quinn property
in the amount of $631.00. The work was completed by the Plaintiff
WALL(A.PC)
^EYSATUW

in a satisfactory manner on August 3, 1993, and Defendant Aspen
Construction has failed to pay Plaintiff for said work.
10.

That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in

the amount of $631.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1993 as
Entry No. 387098 in Book 751 at Page 364 of the official records of
the Summit County Recorder, Summit County, Utah, on the Quinn
property which is situate in Summit County, Utah, and more
particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
11.

That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant Aspen

Construction Plaintiff performed miscellaneous plumbing work at Guy
Poolhouse property.

The work was completed in a satisfactory

manner on July 26, 1993 and the value of said work, is $1,666.00
which Defendant Aspen Construction has failed to pay to the
Plaintiff.
12.

That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in

the amount of $1,666.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1993 as
Entry NO. 387096 in Book 751 at Page 00362 of the official records
of the Summit County Recorder on the Guy Poolhouse property which
is situate in Summit County, Utah, and more particularly described
as follows:
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER

VALLEY, according to the official plat
thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
13.
WALL(A.PC)
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That pursuant to oral agreement with the Plaintiff

Defendant Aspen Construction utilized Plaintiff's backhoe for work
at the Thaynes Canyon property.

There was no agreement between

Defendant Aspen Construction and the Plaintiff which permitted
Aspen to utilize this piece of equipment. The reasonable value for
such use is $100.00 which Defendant Aspen Construction has failed
to pay the Plaintiff.
14.

That pursuant to written

and oral agreements with

Defendant Aspen Construction, Plaintiff installed the rough, subrough, and finish plumbing at the Thaynes Canyon property which
work was completed satisfactorily up to the time Plaintiff was
terminated from the job on August 1, 1993. The original contract
was $13,000.00 plus extras which the parties further contracted for
in the amount of $1,158.00.

The cost to complete the remaining

work under the contract is $2,000.00.
15.

The heating

system installed at the Thaynes Canyon

property has some deficiencies more particularly leakage and poor
air flow to one bedroom as well as no duct or ducts to a portion of
the basement in the area of the wet bar. Defendants have failed to
show by a preponderance of evidence that it is necessary to
completely remove the existing system and install a new system.
More particularly, Defendants have failed to establish by a
preponderance

of

evidence that the three furnaces

currently

installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of said
furnaces is improperly sized notwithstanding the testimony of
Defendant's expert to the contrary which is vague at best.

The

type and size of the ducting to the furnaces meets the Uniform
VALL(A.PC)
YS AT LAW

Mechanical Code requirements and no higher requirements or standard
were contracted for by the parties.
Many of the problems which exist with the present system can
be corrected with further adjustments and fine tuning of the system
such as completing the installation of the thermostats as designed
by the Plaintiff and the connection and operation of the zone
dampers.

However, in order to correct these deficiencies it will

cost Defendant Aspen the sum of $7,000.00. The equitable value of
the work performed and benefit conferred upon said property by the
heating system installed by the Plaintiff is $9,173.00.

This

amount represents the total amount of the price contracted for by
the parties in the amount of $12,265.00 less $3,092.00 to complete
the unfinished portion of the heating system.
16.

That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant Aspen

Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at the Thaynes Canyon
property for the sum of $1,015.00. Said work having been completed
on August 1, 1993.
17.

That pursuant to an oral agreement with Defendant Aspen

Construction Plaintiff installed a sewer and water lateral from the
curb to the house at the Thaynes Canyon property which was
completed on or about August 1, 1993.

This contract was entered

into separate and apart from any other contracts pertaining to
installation of any other portion of the sewer and water laterals
to said property or the contract relating to the rough, sub-rough
and finished plumbing of said property. The agreement entered into
by the parties and the reasonable value for said work is $3,200.00
WALL(APC)
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for which Plaintiff has not been paid. Defendants did not present
evidence which controverted the cost of the installation of the
water and sewer laterals from the street to the curb at either the
Thaynes Canyon property or the property at 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive
in the amount of $7,000.00.
18.

That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in

the amount of $30,647.20 was timely filed on September 14, 1993, as
Entry No. 387097 in Book 751 at Page 363 on the property identified
as 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive and which is more particularly described
as follows:
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8
according to the official plat thereof as filed
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder,
Coalville City, Utah, situate in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
19.

That Defendant Aspen Construction has paid to date the

sum of $17,000.00 which has been credited to the contracts relating
to the Thaynes Canyon property and after crediting said amount to
said contracts Defendant Aspen Construction owes the Plaintiff
$8,646.00 for the contracts relating to the Thaynes Canyon property
and $1,666.00 for the Guy Poolhouse property and $631.00 to the
Quinn property for a total of $10,943.00.
20.

The Plaintiff has prevailed with regard to its mechanic's

lien claims and having complied with the requirements of Utah Code
Annotated

§38-1-7 Plaintiff is entitled

to an award

of its

attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18.

The

court finds in consideration of the complexity of the case and the
total amount involved, Plaintiff should be awarded as part of its
WALL(APC)
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recovery the amount of $7,500.00 as attorney's fees as well as its
costs incurred in prosecuting this action including the filing of
the

liens

against the

properties.

subject properties

and

sale

This amount is to be incorporated

of said

jointly and

severally as part of Plaintiff's liens on the three subject
properties identified more particularly herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for the

installation of the gas line at the property of Defendant Diane
Quinn in the amount of $631.00.
2.

That the mechanic • s lien filed on the property identified

as the Diane Quinn property situate in Summit County, Utah, and
more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in^the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
is a good, sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of
$631.00 and that the interests of Defendants Aspen Construction and
Diane M. Quinn are decreed junior, inferior and subordinate to the
interest of the Plaintiff and that said lien may be foreclosed by
the sale of said property by the Summit County Sheriff under an
order of sale to be issued by this Court and that from the proceeds
of said sale Plaintiff is to recover the amount of said lien
together with its attorney's fees in the amount of $7,500.00 which
is to be taxed as costs as well as the costs related to the
prosecution of this lawsuit including the filing of said lien, sale
fALL(APC)
YS AT LAW
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of said property and interest which has accrued since the date of
work completion, to-wit:

August 1, 1993.

In the event there

results a deficiency after applying all amounts from said sale to
the amount due and owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is to be awarded
a judgment against Defendant Aspen Construction for any such
deficiency.
3.

That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for

various miscellaneous plumbing work performed at the Guy Poolhouse
property in the amount of $1,666.00.
4.

That the mechanic's lien filed on the Guy Poolhouse

property which

is situate

in Salt Lake County, Utah, more

particularly described as follows:
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER

VALLEY, according to the official plat
thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville/ City,
Utah.
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of
$1,666.00

and

that

the

interest

of

the

Defendants

Aspen

Construction and Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy are decreed
junior, inferior and subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff
and that said lien may be foreclosed by the sale of said property
by the Summit County Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by
this Court and from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to
recover the amount of said lien together with its attorney's fees
in the amount of $7,500.00 which are to be taxed as costs as well
as the costs related to the prosecution of this lawsuit including
!VALL(APC)
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the filing of said lien, sale of said property and interest which
has accrued since the date of work completion, to-wit:
1993.

July 28,

In the event any deficiency results after applying all

amounts from said sale to the amount due and owing the Plaintiff,
Plaintiff is to be awarded a judgment against Defendant Aspen
Construction, for any such deficiency.
5.

Concerning

the

Thaynes

Canyon

property,

valid

and

enforceable agreements existed for the installation of the water
and sewer lateral from the curb to the house in the amount of
$3,200.00; installation of the rough, sub-rough and finished
plumbing

including

extras

in the amount of

$14,158.00

less

$2,000.00 for offsets to finish said plumbing; the installation of
a gas line in the amount of $1,015.00; use of a backhoe in the
amount of $100.00.

Also, a valid agreement existed for the

installation of the sewer and water laterals from the street to the
curb at the Thaynes Canyon property and 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive in
the amount of $7,000.00. In addition to the foregoing, a benefit
has been conferred upon the Thaynes Canyon property by Plaintifffs
installation of a forced air heating system and after deducting
$3,092.00 to finish the uncompleted portion of said work and
crediting $7,000.00 to correct the deficiencies identified in the
Court's Findings of Fact, Plaintiff is entitled to recover on an
equitable basis the sum of $2,173.00 for said heating system.
After crediting the $17,000.00 in payments made by Defendant Aspen
Construction for the work performed on the Thaynes Canyon property
the balance due and owing Plaintiff is $8,646.00.

VALL(A.PC)
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6.

That the mechanicfs lien filed on the property identified

herein as the Thaynes Canyon property and situate in Summit County,
Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
All Of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8
according to the official plat thereof as filed
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder,
Coalville City, Utah.
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of
$8,646.00

and

that

the

interest

of

the

Defendants

Aspen

Construction and Thomas D. Guy are decreed junior, inferior and
subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff and that said lien may
be foreclosed by the sale of said property by the Summit County
Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by this Court and that
from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to recover the amount
of said lien together with its attorney's fees of $7,apo.OO which
are to be taxed as costs as well as the costs related to the
prosecution of this action including the filing of said lien, sale
of said property and interest which has accrued since the date of
work completion, to-wit:

August 1, 1993.

Should there be any

deficiency after applying all amounts from said sale to the amount
due and owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is awarded a judgment
against Defendant Aspen Construction for any such deficiency.
DATED this

day of
BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOEL
District Court Judge

, 1997.
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:

CASE NO.940300014CN
APPEALS NO: 970580-CA

Vs.

:

THOMAS D. GUY & ASPEN CONSTRUCTION
Defendants.

:

This matter is before the Court on remand from the Utah
Court of Appeals with instructions to determine the prevailing
party in this case, in light of their ruling, and to determine an
allocation of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
The Court has received briefs, affidavits, has heard oral
argniment, and having taken the matter under advisement now rules
as follows:
The Court first observes that the attorney's fees in this
case on both sides seems excessively high.

Plaintiff initially

claimed approximately $30,000.00 in contractual damages, but has
admitted throughout that defendant would be entitled to a
$17,000.00 credit for amounts paid
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Defendant on the other hand claims roughly

$25,000.00 in damages in based on plaintiff's negligence.

If the

claims for all three properties are considered together, then
after the trial courts findings and the Court of Appeals ruling
there would be a net recovery to plaintiff of approximately
$1,770.00.

Each attorney has billed in excess of $30,000.00 in

attorneys fees.

While the Court realizes that the issues were

rather varied and complex in this matter, the Court does not feel
that the case was so complex as to justify the awarding of
attorney's fees in that amount to either party.
Both parties have submitted affidavits which allocate
attorney's fees to the three different mechanics liens that are
the subject matter of the lawsuit.

That is the Guy pool house

property, the Diane Quinn property, and the Thayne's canyon
property.

Plaintiff, however, urges the Court to consider all of

the properties together rather than individually, in which case
the plaintiff would have a net recovery in this matter of
$1,770.00.

Defendant asks the Court to separate the claims and

treat them individually, in which case defendant claims a net
recovery on the Thayne's canyon property and concedes a net
recovery in favor of plaintiff on the Guy pool house and Quinn
properties, but argues as to those properties that the claims
were undisputed.

It is clear that the primary dispute in this

WHIPPLE VS. ASPEN
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case arose from the Thayne's canyon property.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
However, the Court

points out that while the defendant says the Guy pool house and
Quinn property claims were not disputed, neither did the
defendant pay those claims prior to trial, and indeed when
plaintiff attempted to introduce supplemental evidence regarding
the filing of the lien and the mailing of the notice of the lien
to the owners of those properties, the defendant vigorously
opposed the introduction of that supplemental evidence.
In any event under all the circumstances, the Court has
elected to treat the three properties individually.

The Court

does so for the reason that when all is said and done, the Guy
pool house and Quinn properties were indeed a minor part of this
case, and they should not be relied upon to support a claim for a
significant amount of attorneys fees which were largely incurred
on a separate matter, i.e., the Thayne's canyon property, for
which the plaintiff did not prevail.
Plaintiff allocates $11,250.00 in attorneys fees to the pool
house property and a like amount to the Quinn property.
Plaintiff clearly prevailed on those claims.

Defendant on the

other hand, allocates only $2,281.00 of its attorneys fees to the
Quinn property, and $2,250.00 to the pool house property.

The

Court has reviewed the affidavits, is familiar with the
complexity of the issues involving in those claims, and finds
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that a reasonable amount of attorneys fees for the prosecution of
those claims would be $2,000.00 as to each claim for a total of
$4,000.00 on those claims in favor of plaintiff.
The Court now turns to the Thayne's canyon property. As to
the contract claims only, the Court at trial awarded plaintiff
$32,646.00 which included the following:
1.

2.

Water and sewer
laterals from curb to house

$3,200.00

Plumbing ($14,158.00
less $2,000 for offsets)

$12,158.00

3.

Gas line

4.

Backhoe

5.

Water and sewer
laterals from the street to the curb
HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less
$3,092.00 to finish

6.

$1,015.00
$100.00

TOTAL:

$7,000.00
$9,173.00
$32,646.00

AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS:
Offset for damages based on deficient
work

- $17,000.00

- $7,000.00
TOTAL:

$8,646.00

Less contract price per Court of Appeals
GRAND TOTAL:

- $9,173.00
($

527.00)

Under a strict application of "Net Recovery Rule" defendant
would be the prevailing party on the Thayne's canyon property.
It is important to the Court to note however that defendant is
such only by the amount of $527.00.

The Court feels where
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plaintiff was claiming roughly $13,000.00 on the Thayne's canyon
property (allowing for the $17,000.00 already paid), and where
defendant was claiming $25,000.00 in damages for the negligence
of the plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only
$527.00, the Court is of the opinion that this is essentially a
"draw" and no attorney's fees should be awarded.

The Appellate

Courts in our state have acknowledged that the "net recovery
rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be applied
strictly under all circumstances.
Moreover, the Court thinks there is an additional reason to
award no fees.

The only reason that the defendant received a net

recovery, is because it prevailed on an essentially legal issue,
that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors
license prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis for
the installation of the HVAC.

This issue was clearly distinct

and separate from the defendants negligence claim.

The Court

does not feel that they are "inextricably tied together" as urged
by the defendant.

Had the defendant not prevailed on this legal

issue concerning the plaintiff's Licensure, then plaintiff would
have obtained a net recovery of approximately $8,646.00.

The

Court therefore is of the opinion that the defendant should have
allocated attorney fees to the mechanics lien claim of plaintiff
and the time expended litigating the Licensure issues but has
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failed to do so.
Accordingly, the Court awards no attorneys fees on the
Thayne's canyon property, and a total of $4,000.00 in favor or
plaintiff on the Thomas Guy pool house and Diane Quinn
properties.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order.

Dated this cQfo

Day of JANUARY, 2000:

U

Frank G. Noel
Presiding Judge
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND
HEATING, Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-appellant,
v.
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, Thomas D. Guy,
Claire B. Guy, and Diane
M. Quinn, Defendants, Appellant, and Crossappellees.
No. 971580-CA.
March 18, 1999.
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1999.
Subcontractor brought actions against general
contractor to foreclose mechanics' liens on three
properties on which it had provided heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and
plumbing work. Consolidating actions, the Third
District Court, Coalville Department, Pat B. Brian
and Frank G. Noel, JJ., entered judgment in favor of
subcontractor, including an award of attorney fees.
General contractor appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Wilkins, P.J., held that: (1) subcontractor could not
recover for HVAC work because it was not licensed
to perform such work; (2) granting of subcontractor's
motion to reopen action to take additional evidence
was not abuse of discretion; (3) general contractor did
not adequately marshal evidence in support of
challenged factual findings, precluding consideration
of those findings on appeal; (4) remand was required
to determine whether general contractor was
prevailing party and thus entitled to attorney fees; (5)
denial of general contractor's motion to dismiss action
based on subcontractor's noncompliance with
scheduling order was not abuse of discretion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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OPINION
WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
f 1 Appellant Aspen Construction (Aspen) appeals
from a judgment awarding appellee A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing and Heating Whipple (Whipple)
$3,943 for heating, venting, and air conditioning
(HVAC) work it performed, and allowing Whipple to
foreclose on three separate mechanics' liens. Aspen
also appeals the trial court's decision to award
Whipple $7,500 in attorney fees. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND
f 2 In 1993, Aspen, a general contractor, entered
into an agreement with Whipple, a licensed plumbing
contractor, to provide labor and materials for HVAC
and plumbing work on three separate properties.
When problems arose with the HVAC work on one of
the properties, Aspen discharged Whipple and refused
to remit any further payment until corrections were
made. Whipple responded by filing mechanics' liens
on all three properties and commencing three separate
foreclosure actions that were later consolidated for
purposes of trial.
1f 3 Before trial, Aspen filed a motion to dismiss the
HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim on
the basis that Whipple lacked proper HVAC licensure
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998).
The trial court granted Aspen's motion, however, it
invoked common law principles of equity *521 and
determined that because Whipple had conferred a
benefit upon Aspen, Whipple should be awarded the
value of that benefit. The court further determined
that there were deficiencies in Whipple's HVAC work
and therefore, awarded Whipple the value of this
work, less the cost Aspen would incur in correcting
the deficiencies.
If 4 In June 1995, the trial court issued a scheduling
order which required Whipple to disclose all
witnesses by August 1, 1995, and respond to all
discovery requests by August 31, 1995.
On
September 22, 1995, Aspen filed another motion to
dismiss alleging Whipple had violated the scheduling
order by failing to disclose witnesses and respond to
Aspen's discovery requests. The trial court denied
Aspen's motion, ruling that Aspen was not
sufficiently prejudiced because Whipple provided
Aspen with a complete list of witnesses it intended to
Copyright (c) West Group 2002
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call at trial.
If 5 During trial, which took place in early October
1995, the court heard evidence concerning the value
of the work Whipple had performed on the various
properties. Aspen also pursued its counterclaim
seeking damages for the allegedly defective HVAC
work. The trial did not conclude as scheduled and
was continued until November.
K 6 When the trial resumed in late November, the
trial court allowed Ken Whipple to testify as an
HVAC expert witness. Mr. Whipple, although not a
licensed HVAC contractor during the earlier part of
the trial, had obtained his HVAC license before the
trial resumed.
In response to Mr. Whipple's
testimony, Aspen attempted to introduce the
testimony of its expert regarding defects in the HVAC
work. However, the trial court restricted the scope of
this testimony because Aspen failed to list its expert
as a potential expert witness.
f 7 At the close of trial, Aspen argued that Whipple
had failed to meet the threshold requirement of
establishing valid mechanics' liens. In its minute
entry dated November 30, 1995, the trial court
requested that Aspen prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment, and concluded
that, because neither party clearly prevailed, any
award of attorney fees would be improper.
f 8 Aspen's counsel prepared a monetary judgment
in favor of Whipple along with proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Whipple objected to the
proposed findings because they did not include an
order specifying foreclosure of the three liens and
prepared separate findings which included an order of
foreclosure. Aspen's counsel objected to Whipple's
proposed findings, arguing there was insufficient
evidence to support a foreclosure order. Whipple
then filed a motion to reopen the case to take
additional evidence regarding its compliance with the
mechanics' lien foreclosure statute. The trial court
granted Whipple's motion "in the interests of justice."
H 9 On September 19, 1996, the trial court held a
supplemental hearing and received evidence of the
mechanics' liens and also took under advisement
Whipple's request for reconsideration of an award of
attorney fees. Whipple asserted that now having
"prevailed" it was entitled to attorney fees as the
"prevailing party." Aspen also requested attorney
fees, arguing it prevailed at the outset on the claim for
defective HVAC work. On March 31, 1997, the trial
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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court entered formal findings of fact and conclusions
of law and a judgment awarding Whipple $3,943 for
its HVAC work. The trial court also denied Aspen's
fee request, instead awarding Whipple $7,500 in
attorney fees. In addition, the trial court allowed
Whipple to foreclose on the three mechanics' liens
and valued a portion of Whipple's plumbing work for
sewer laterals at $3,200. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] f 10 Aspen raises several arguments on
appeal. First, Aspen contends Utah Code Ann. §
58-55-604 (1998) barred Whipple from maintaining
this action and that the trial court erred in granting
Whipple recovery on equitable grounds. This issue
turns on the trial court's interpretation of a statute,
which we review for correctness, without deference
to the trial court's conclusions. See Butterfteld
Lumber, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d
1330, 1332 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). Second, Aspen
argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting
*522 Whipple's motion to reopen on grounds not
provided in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. "Consideration of a motion to grant a
new trial or open a judgment for additional evidence
under ... [Rule 59] is a matter left to the discretion of
the trial judge, and that decision will be reversed only
if the judge has abused that discretion by acting
unreasonably." Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81
(Utah Ct.App. 1989) (citation omitted).
[3] [4] [5] f 11 Third, Aspen claims there is
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's
determination that Whipple adequately complied with
section 38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien statute or its
valuation of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer
laterals. "We review the trial court's findings of fact
for clear error and its legal conclusions for
correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646
(Utah 1997). Fourth, Aspen argues the trial court
erred in denying its request for attorney fees and
failed to properly allocate Whipple's attorney fee
award according to its underlying claims. Whether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question
of law, which we review for correctness. See
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992). Finally, Aspen argues the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss Whipple's
case for noncompliance with the scheduling order,
permitting Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC
expert, and in limiting the testimony of Aspen's
expert witness. Trial courts have broad discretion in
managing the cases before them and we will not
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interfere with their decisions absent an abuse of
discretion. See Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.
R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct.App.1992).
ANALYSIS
1. Licensing Requirements
[6] H 12 Aspen contends that Whipple's failure to
comply with the licensing requirements of section
58-55-604, precludes Whipple from maintaining this
action and that the trial court erred in allowing
Whipple to recover on equitable grounds. We agree.
f 13 Section 58-55-604 of the Utah Code provides
that "[n]o contractor may ... commence or maintain
any action ... for collection of compensation for
performing any act for which a license is required ...
without alleging and proving that he [or she] was a
properly licensed contractor when the contract sued
upon was entered into, and when the alleged cause of
action arose." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998).
Our Legislature has determined that proper licensure
is of paramount importance and that if a contractor
performs work without the requisite license, it should
be denied compensation. Thus, the statute serves the
dual purpose of protecting the public from
incompetent
contractors,
while
sanctioning
contractors who fail to obtain proper licensure.
K 14 However, this statutory bar is not without
exception. We have recognized that the statutory bar
"does not preclude the application of the previous
common law exceptions to the general rule of nonrecovery. " Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen,
801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). Thus, a
court addressing the issue of whether an unlicensed
contractor may maintain an action for quantum meruit
must: (1) determine whether the contractor is
properly licensed or whether its status as an
unlicensed contractor places it within the purview of
section 58-55-604; and (2) determine whether the
contractor is entitled to relief under common law
principles despite its non-licensure and support that
conclusion with appropriate findings of fact. In other
words, if the court concludes the claim falls within
the purview of section 58-55-604, but the common
law exceptions apply, then the statutory bar will not
preclude suit. However, if the court determines
section 58-55-604 applies but the common law
exceptions are inapplicable, then section 58-55-604
absolutely bars the action.
[7] K 15 Here, the trial court stated "[s]ection
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58-55-604 U.C.A. is controlling in this case .... [and
Whipple's] failure to comply with the statute is
sufficient grounds for the Motion to Dismiss to be
granted as a matter of law...." The trial court then
proceeded to allow Whipple to maintain its action
below and ultimately recover under "principles of
equity."
The court failed to adequately explain
which common law rules, if any, it applied in this
case, or support its *523 decision with appropriate
findings of fact. Nevertheless, because of our
obligation to affirm the trial court on any available
basis, see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376
(Utah 1994), we address whether any of the common
law exceptions allow Whipple to maintain its action.
[8] [9] If 16 The Utah common law exceptions are
premised on the theory that rigid insistence on proper
licensure is unnecessary as long as the public is
otherwise protected from the harm the statute is
designed to prevent. See American Rural Cellular v.
Systems Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035, 1040
(Utah Ct.App. 1995). Utah courts have generally
allowed unlicensed contractors to recover for quantum
meruit in four instances where, notwithstanding the
contractor's lack of proper licensure, the licensing
statute's purpose is met.
U 17 First, unlicensed contractors have been allowed
to recover when the party for whom the work is to be
done possesses skill or expertise in the field. See id.
Here, there is no evidence showing Aspen was
knowledgeable or skilled in HVAC work. We cannot
infer from Aspen's general contracting status that it
possessed special skill or expertise sufficient to
protect itself from incompetent HVAC work. See
Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d
766, 768 (Utah 1985) (rejecting unlicensed
contractor's argument that contracting party's
reservation of plumbing work for itself rendered it
knowledgeable in that field).
f 18 Second, an unlicensed contractor may recover
if the work it performed was supervised by a licensed
contractor. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at
1040. The cases in which this principle has been
applied have all involved supervision or labor by a
properly licensed third party thereby protecting the
original contracting party from the unlicensed
contractor's incompetence. See Kinkella v. Baugh,
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) (refusing to apply
statutory bar where unlicensed contractor was
supervised by licensed contractor and therefore,
original contracting party "received whatever
protection is afforded by compliance with the
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licensing statute"); Motivated Management Int'l v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (allowing
unlicensed contractor to recover where "at least part
of the construction was performed by a licensed
contractor" because the licensed party's involvement
adequately protected original contracting party);
Fillmore Prods, v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561
P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1977) (providing when general
contractor hired unlicensed subcontractor to provide
plumbing work, unlicensed subcontractor could
recover because entire project was supervised by
licensed project engineer who ensured job was done
properly). In this case, Aspen did not have the added
protection of a properly licensed contractor to ensure
the HVAC work was adequately completed. Instead,
Whipple performed the work on its own without the
supervision of someone with proper licensure. Thus,
we conclude Whipple's HVAC work was not
adequately supervised to invoke this exception to the
statutory bar.
% 19 Third, if the reason a contractor fails to obtain
proper licensure is minor and does not undermine its
ability to perform its work, the unlicensed contractor
may recover. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d
at 1040; see also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681
P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Utah 1984) (permitting recovery
where contractor mistakenly, but in good faith,
believed he could perform work under partner's
license); Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 804-05
(Utah 1979) (allowing recovery where otherwise
properly qualified contractor mistakenly allowed
license to lapse for nonpayment of renewal fee).
Here, the record shows Whipple has provided HVAC
work for many years without proper licensure.
Although Mr. Whipple claims he believed in good
faith his general plumbing contractors license allowed
him to install HVAC forced air heating systems, the
fact is, it did not. Until trial in this case, Whipple
had never complied with licensing requirements
showing he possessed the technical competence or
financial qualifications for licensure.
Equally
important, the trial court heard extensive evidence
about the inadequacies of Whipple's HVAC work and
ultimately concluded the HVAC work was deficient.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Whipple's
failure to obtain proper HVAC licensure *524
precludes application of this common law exception.
H 20 Finally, courts have considered whether the
contracting party relied on the subcontractor's
representations that he was properly licensed and
whether the subcontractor has posted a performance
bond. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at
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1041. Here, Whipple actively solicited and engaged
in HVAC work for more than sixteen years. As a
result, Whipple implicitly represented to its customers
that it was properly licensed and qualified to perform
such work. In addition, although Whipple claims it
maintained liability insurance to protect its customers,
Whipple has offered no evidence of a performance
bond. Therefore, we conclude Whipple does not fall
within this final exception to the statutory bar.
H 21 In sum, we have determined the trial court
properly applied section 58-55-604 to this case
because Whipple performed HVAC work without
proper licensure. We also conclude, however, that
the trial court erred in allowing Whipple to recover
for HVAC work under "principles of equity" because
the common law exceptions to section 58-55-604 are
inapplicable in this case. We therefore reverse the
trial court's ruling regarding this issue, and vacate
any award to Whipple based on the HVAC work.
2. Motion to Reopen
[10] 122 Aspen next argues the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Whipple's motion to reopen "in
the interests of justice." We disagree.
K 23 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a
motion to reopen for the purpose of taking additional
testimony after the case has been submitted but prior
to entry of judgment. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d
496, 497 (Utah 1976). Furthermore, the court has
directed lower courts to consider such a motion "in
light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in
the interest of fairness and substantial justice." Id.
K 24 Here, the trial judge stated "[I am g]oing to
grant the motion to reopen and in the interests of
justice, I think there [are] some glaring
misunderstandings in the presentation of the evidence;
and the Court is going to allow the plaintiff to re-open
as requested in their motion." (Emphasis added.) In
addition, the mechanics' lien claims in this case were
actually litigated and the court granted Whipple's
motion to address the parties' basic disagreement over
the validity of the liens at issue. Testimony of the
filing, service, and content of the liens had already
been received into evidence. The documents sought
to be introduced by the motion to reopen were
exhibits to Whipple's complaint served on Aspen to
commence the actions. Nothing unexpected was
allowed into evidence as a result of the motion to
reopen being granted. The trial court's decision did
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not deprive Aspen of a full and fair consideration of
the issues regarding the mechanics' liens. Therefore,
we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
3. Compliance with Mechanics' Lien Statute and
Value of Lateral Work
[11] % 25 Aspen also argues there is insufficient
evidence to support two factual determinations by the
trial court: (1) that Whipple complied with section
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute; and (2) that the
value of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer laterals
was $3,200. In contesting the trial court's ultimate
conclusions regarding Whipple's compliance with the
mechanic's lien statute and the value of its plumbing
work, Aspen must show either that the conclusions
are incorrect given the findings or that the "factual
findings underlying ... [the trial court's]
determination^] are clearly erroneous." Cellcom v.
Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 189
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). On appeal, Aspen attacks the
findings themselves.
[12] f 26 To challenge the trial court's findings,
Aspen must "marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidencef,]" thus making them clearly erroneous. Id.
(citations omitted). We will uphold the trial court's
findings of fact if the party *525 challenging the
findings fails to appropriately marshal all the evidence
supporting the findings. See Allred v. Brown, 893
P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct.App. 1995).
[13] Tf 27 Here, Aspen has simply failed to meet this
burden. It did not marshal all the evidence supporting
the trial court's findings or show that, viewing the
evidence in a light favorable to the court's rulings, the
findings were clearly erroneous. Aspen ignores, for
example, the fact that Whipple offered copies of the
mechanics' liens into evidence which the court
accepted into evidence as being authenticated
documents. Aspen also disregards the extensive
evidence presented at trial regarding the value of
Whipple's plumbing work. Rather, Aspen merely
restates those facts favorable to its position or in the
alternative argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's findings.
If 28 Although Aspen maintains it adequately
marshaled the evidence in an addendum to its brief,
the Utah Supreme Court has denounced the practice
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of marshaling evidence in an appendix stating that
"[t]his does not comply with the requirement to
marshal evidence. It is improper for counsel to
attempt to enlarge the page limit of briefing by
placing critical facts in appendices." DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 n. 3 (Utah
1994). Worse yet, the addendum does not include a
properly focused marshaling of the evidence
supporting particular findings under attack, but rather
is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in the
record.
Thus, we must assume the evidence
supported the findings underlying the trial court's
determination that Whipple complied with section
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute and that it
adequately valued Whipple's plumbing work.
Accordingly, Aspen's argument fails.
H 29 We note however, that the trial court's
Conclusion of Law No. 5 includes Whipple's HVAC
work as part of the order of foreclosure. As
previously discussed, Whipple is precluded by section
58-55-604 from recovering for its HVAC work.
Thus, to the extent Conclusion of Law No. 5 is
inconsistent with this opinion, it, and any part of the
judgment that follows therefrom, is vacated.
4. Attorney Fees
[14] 1f 30 Aspen next asserts the trial court erred in
denying its request for attorney fees arguing that
because it prevailed against Whipple on the HVAC
portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim, it is the
prevailing party. In light of our disposition of the
preceding issues, this contention may have merit.
f 31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action."
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case,
although the trial court initially granted Aspen's
motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure,
it went on to award Whipple the value of the work
performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this
finding, the trial court concluded that Whipple was
the prevailing party and entitled to an award of
attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be
erroneous in light of our determination that section
58-55-604 precludes Whipple from recovering for its
HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record,
it appears the HVAC claim was the single most
important issue in this case and Aspen, having fully
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prevailed on the HVAC claim in this appeal, may
now be entitled to prevailing party status under
section 38-1-18. If on remand the trial court
determines Aspen is the prevailing party (FN1) under
section 38-1-18, then Aspen must be given the
opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney
fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore
remand this issue to the trial court for a
redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent
with this opinion and the entry of findings necessary
to support the revised award.
•526 [15][16][17] f 32 Aspen also asserts the trial
court erred in failing to properly allot Whipple's
attorney fees award according to its underlying
claims. We agree. The Utah Supreme Court has
required a party seeking attorney fees to allocate its
request for fees according to its underlying claim.
See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998).
The party must differentiate between the fees and time
expended for "(1) successful claims for which there
may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co.
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This
requirement also obligates the trial court to make
findings which closely resemble the requesting party's
allocation of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d
at 55. Finally, the trial court must clearly identify
and document the factors it considered dispositive in
calculating the award. See id.
Absent such an
allocation and documentation, this court cannot
adequately review the trial court's decision. See id.
at 57.
[18] f 33 Here, Whipple submitted an affidavit
requesting attorney fees. However, the affidavit did
not differentiate between the work done that was
subject to a fee award and work that was not. The
court acknowledged that it "had difficulty, based on [
Whipple's] attorney fee affidavit, in separating the
amount of time involved with the mechanics' liens as
opposed to the amount of time spent on other
matters." Although Whipple's failure to apportion
attorney fees was a sufficient basis for the trial court
to deny its fee request, see Utah Farm Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), the court
went on to state that "in consideration of the
complexity of the case and the total amount involved,
plaintiff should be awarded ... $7,500 in attorney
fees...."
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K 34 Because the trial court failed to properly
categorize the fee request or detail the factors it
considered in computing the award, see Foote, 962
P.2d at 56 (concluding "[w]here the parties'
evidentiary submissions in support of a request for
attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's
evaluation of those fees"), we reverse and remand the
issue of fees to the trial court for a redetermination of
the prevailing party, and, based on that determination,
an award of attorney fees consistent with this opinion.
5. Scheduling Order and Expert Testimony
f 35 Finally, Aspen contends the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to dismiss Whipple's case for
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting
Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert, and in
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's
expert witness.
A. Scheduling Order
[19][20][21] K 36 Aspen asserts the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing Whipple to proceed
with its case despite its failure to comply with the trial
court's scheduling order. Because the trial judge
deals directly with the parties and the discovery
process, he or she has great latitude in determining
the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the
court's business. See Utah Dep't of Tramp, v.
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). As a result,
trial courts have broad discretion in determining
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants
sanction. See id. The purpose behind a scheduling
order is to allow the parties to properly prepare for
trial and to save the parties from unnecessary
expenses. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1361.
f 37 Here, the trial court determined that although
Whipple failed to adequately comply with the
scheduling order, Aspen was provided with sufficient
information to prepare for trial. The court noted that
in Whipple's response to Aspen's interrogatories,
Whipple had specified the witnesses it was going to
call at trial and the substance of their testimony.
Thus, the trial court determined Aspen was not
prejudiced by Whipple's violation of the scheduling
order.
Because Aspen obtained the information
necessary to adequately prepare for trial, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to dismiss Whipple's case.
*527. B. Expert Testimony
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[22] f 38 Aspen also asserts the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing Ken Whipple to testify as an
expert regarding the cost and adequacy of Whipple's
HVAC work and in limiting the scope of testimony
provided by Aspen's expert witness. We conclude
that any errors in this regard were harmless.
[23] [24] f 39 In order to prove its entitlement to
relief on appeal, Aspen must show it was prejudiced
or harmed by the trial court's action. See Astill v.
Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App.1998).
Because we have determined section 58-55-604
precludes Whipple from maintaining an action to
recover the cost of its HVAC work, the expert
testimony regarding the valuation of Whipple's
HVAC work is irrelevant. In other words, the cost
Whipple incurred in performing the HVAC work is
no longer an issue. Furthermore, Aspen does not
contest the court's finding concerning the cost Aspen
will incur in repairing the defective HVAC work and
therefore, we assume its accuracy. See Cellcom, 939
P.2d at 189. Thus, the trial court's rulings regarding
the admission of expert testimony could not have
harmed or prejudiced Aspen in any way and
therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this
ground.
CONCLUSION
f 40 Because Whipple failed to comply with the
licensure requirements of section 58-55-604 and none
of the common law exceptions to the statutory bar
apply, Whipple is precluded from recovering for its
HVAC work. Further, we have determined the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Whipple's Rule 59 motion "in the interests of
justice." Also, because Aspen failed to marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings
regarding Whipple's compliance with the mechanics'
lien statute and the value of Whipple's sewer lateral
work, we decline to disturb those findings. We also
remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court for
a redetermination of the prevailing party and a proper
allocation of attorney fees to that party. Finally,
Aspen was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions
in failing to dismiss Whipple's case for
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting
Ken Whipple to testify as a HVAC expert, or in
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's
expert witness.
f 41 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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K 42 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
(FNl.) On remand, the trial court may find helpftil
the guidance on this issue offered by Mountain
States Broad, Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-58
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND
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Thomas D. GUY; and Aspen Construction, a Utah
corporation,
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Subcontractor brought actions against general
contractor to foreclose mechanics' liens on three
properties on which it had provided heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and
plumbing work. Consolidating actions, the Third
District Court, Coalville Department, Pat B. Brian
and Frank G. Noel, JJ., entered judgment in favor of
subcontractor, including an award of attorney fees.
General contractor appealed. The Court of Appeals,
977 P.2d 518, Wilkins, P.J., affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the
District Court, Coalville Department, Frank G. Noel,
J., entered judgment in favor of contractor and
declined to award attorneys fees.
Contractor
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that:
(1) terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" as
used in statute and case law were synonymous, and
(2) neither contractor nor subcontractor was the
successful party in mechanics' lien foreclosure action
brought by subcontractor.
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[1] Costs <§^208
102 —
102IX Taxation
102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing
Officer.
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is
a question of law that appellate court reviews for
correctness.
[2] Appeal and Error <§^842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions
Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Statutes <S==>176
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl76 Judicial Authority and Duty.
Matters of statutory construction are questions of
law that are reviewed for correctness.
[3] Appeal and Error <®^>984(5)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k984 Costs and Allowances
30k984(5) Attorneys' Fees.
Appellate court generally reviews a trial judge's
decision on the amount of attorney fees for abuse of
discretion.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error <£=>842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions
Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
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[4] Appeal and Error <®=* 1024.1
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)6 Questions of Fact on Motions or Other
Interlocutory or Special Proceedings
30kl024.1 In General.
In most decisions dealing with fee awards, appellate
deference is owed to the trial judge who actually
presided over the proceeding and has first-hand
familiarity with the litigation.
[5] Mechanics' Liens <®^310(1)
257 —
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257X1 Enforcement
257k310 Fees and Costs
257k310(l) In General.
A "successful party," for purposes of award of
attorneys fee in mechanics' lien foreclosure action,
includes, but is not limited to, one who successfully
enforces or defends against a lien action.
U.C.A.1953, 384-18.
[6] Mechanics' Liens <@=^310(1)
257 —
257X1 Enforcement
257k310 Fees and Costs
257k310(l) In General.
Terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" as
used in statute and case law were synonymous for
purposes of recovery of attorneys' fee in mechanics'
lien foreclosure action. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18.
[7] Mechanics' Liens <@^310(1)
257 —
257X1 Enforcement
257k310 Fees and Costs
257k310(l) In General.
Neither contractor nor subcontractor was the
successful party in mechanics' lien action brought by
subcontractor, and thus neither were entitled to award
of attorneys fee; action was essentially a draw, since
subcontractor sought $13,000 on lien and contractor
sought $25,000 in negligence damages from
subcontractor, and trial court awarded contractor only
$527. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18.
[8] Mechanics' Liens <§^310(1)
257 -—
257X1 Enforcement
257k310 Fees and Costs
257k310(l) In General.
A key part of the flexible approach to deciding who
actually is the prevailing party in a mechanics' lien
foreclosure action is common sense; this includes
looking at the amounts actually sought and then
balancing them proportionally with what was
recovered. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18.
*93 Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, for Appellants.
Steven B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge.
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1f 1 Aspen Construction (Aspen) appeals from the
final judgment (on remand from the Utah Court of
Appeals) of the Third District Court denying A.K. &
R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating's (Whipple) claim
for foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien
claim, entering a net judgment against Whipple in the
amount of $527.00, and declining to award Aspen
attorney fees.
BACKGROUND (FN1)
If 2 The initial appeal and the subsequent remand
involved three separate lien foreclosure matters that
were consolidated into one action for trial. (FN2)
The trial court ruled in favor of Whipple on the other
two foreclosure matters, determined the lien amounts
($631.00 for the Dianne Quinn lien and $1,666.00 for
the Tom Guy Poolhouse lien), found Whipple to be
the "successful party" with respect to those liens,
determined reasonable attorney fees related to those
lien foreclosure matters, and entered orders of
foreclosure respecting those two parcels of property.
f 3 On March 18, 1999, we remanded this matter to
the trial court for disposition consistent with our
opinion stating:
The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter
the successful party shall be entitled to recover [a]
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case ... the
trial court... went on to award Whipple the value of
the work performed on Aspen's property. Based in
part on this finding, the trial court concluded that
Whipple was the prevailing party and entitled to an
award of attorney fees. However, this conclusion
may be erroneous in light of our determination that
section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from
recovering *94 for its HVAC work. Based upon
our review of the record, it appears the HVAC
claim was the single most important issue in this
case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on the
HVAC claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to
prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If on
remand the trial court determines Aspen is the
prevailing party under section 38-1-18, then Aspen
must be given the opportunity to present evidence
regarding attorney fees incurred in pursuing its
claim. We therefore remand this issue to the trial
court for a redetermination of the attorney fees
award consistent with this opinion and the entry of
findings necessary to support the revised award.
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A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen
Constr., 1999 UT App 87,f 31, 977 P.2d 518 (
Whipple I) (footnote omitted). On remand, the trial
court conferenced with counsel and set deadlines to
submit memoranda on the issues we identified.
% 4 A hearing was held on November 10, 1999, at
which time arguments were heard and evidence
presented, by way of affidavit, as to the reasonable
attorney fees incurred by the parties. At the time of
the hearing, Whipple's attorney argued that he could
not allocate fees, but after the hearing an affidavit
supporting Whipple's claim for attorney fees was
submitted.
f 5 On January 20, 2000, the trial court again found
Whipple to be the successful party with respect to the
mechanics' lien claim on the Diane Quinn property as
well as the Tom Guy Poolhouse property, and
awarded fees to Whipple in connection with those two
lien foreclosure matters. The trial court denied
Whipple's claim for foreclosure of the $30,647.20
mechanics' lien claim filed against Aspen for the
Thayne's Canyon property because Whipple was not
licensed to perform HVAC work. After calculating
an offset for the HVAC work against Whipple's total
recovery, the court entered a net money judgment in
favor of Aspen and against Whipple in the amount of
$527.00. The court also ruled that the outcome was
essentially a "draw" and concluded neither party
should be awarded its fees because: 1) Aspen had
barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action
involving the Thayne's Canyon property; 2) Aspen
"prevailed on an essentially legal issue;" and 3)
Aspen "should have allocated attorney fees [between]
the mechanics^] lien claim of [Whipple] and the time
expended litigating the Licensure issues but has failed
to do so."
TI 6 Aspen appeals the trial court's failure to award it
attorney fees incurred in successfully defending
against the lien foreclosure aspect of the proceeding.
No cross appeal was filed.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2] f 7 The issue before us is the scope and
meaning of "successful party" in Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-18 (1997).
"Whether attorney fees are
recoverable in an action is a question of law [that] we
review for correctness." Whipple I, 1999 UT App at
f 11. "Matters of statutory construction are questions
of law that are reviewed for correctness." Platts v.
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah
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1997).
[3][4] K 8 Courts generally review a trial judge's
decision on the amount of attorney fees for abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In most decisions
dealing with fee awards, "appellate deference is owed
to the trial judge who actually presided over the
proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the
litigation." Utah Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806
P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
ANALYSIS
[5][6][7] 1f 9 The Utah mechanics' lien statute
provides: "in any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). A
successful party includes, but is not limited to, one
who successfully enforces or defends against a lien
action. See Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079
(Utah Ct.App. 1996); Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969).
*95 Tf 10 Aspen argues that the terms "successful
party" and "prevailing party," as used in the statute
and Utah case law do not have the same meaning and
that success "is determined solely by whether or not
the party asserting the right to enforce the lien was
successful."
f 11 The terms "prevailing party" and "successful
party" are often used synonymously. See Cobabe v.
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 835 n. 1 (Utah
Ct.App. 1989). Black's Law Dictionary defines the
term "prevailing party" as: "A party in whose favor
a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
damages awarded (in certain cases, the court will
award attorney\] fees to the prevailing party). Also
termed successful party." Black's Law Dictionary
1145 (7th ed.1999). Black's defines a "successful
party" as follows:
"Seeprevailing party." Id.
Perhaps the most compelling example of synonymous
usage is our decision in Whipple I, where, referring to
the "successful party" language of section 38-1-18,
we consistently substituted the words "prevailing
party" in our analysis. Whipple I, 1999 UT App at
pp 31, 40; see also Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079
(holding a successful party includes one who
successfully enforces or defends against a lien action);
J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 15
(Utah Ct.App. 1998) ("[A] lien claimant's prima facie
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evidence establishing its right to attorney fees is met
by showing that it is the prevailing party in the
mechanics^] lien cause of action.").
U 12 Further, our courts have addressed
methodologies for determining which party or parties,
perhaps among multiple parties or claims, occupy
prevailing party status in various contexts. See, e.g.,
Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079; Mountain States Broad.
Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
Indeed, "[c]ourts have, in extraordinary situations,
declined to award attorney fees to a prevailing party
in spite of an enforceable contractual provision."
Crawford, 780 P.2d at 836 n. 3. Finally, application
of our "prevailing party" jurisprudence to section
38-1-18 does not detract from its objective. Under
the circumstances presented here, we see no reason
why the terms "successful party" and "prevailing
party" should not be used synonymously when
determining entitlement to attorney fees under section
38-1-18.
K 13 In so ruling, we do not suggest that whether a
claim is ultimately determined to be enforceable under
the provisions of section 38-1-18 is not a factor to be
considered in determining which party or parties
prevail or are successful.
Tf 14 In Mountain States, both parties challenged the
trial court's award granting both sides their attorney
fees. This court, upon review, determined that even
though plaintiff had obtained an offset in its favor,
defendant was clearly the prevailing party. The court
then noted that:
Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for
purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple.
Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if
plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has
prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and
avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has
prevailed. However, this simple analysis cannot be
employed here because both plaintiff and defendant
obtained some monetary relief against the other.
Our review of the relevant case law convinces us
that under the provision at issue, there can be only
one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and
defendant are awarded money damages on claims
arising from the same transaction.
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 555-56 (footnotes
omitted).
% 15 In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v.
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Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), this court
noted that the Mountain States court had rejected a
"blanket adoption of the 'net judgment' rule except as
a good starting point in making determinations of
which party prevailed." Id. at 221. The Occidental
court also noted that Mountain States recognized "
'the need for a flexible and reasoned approach to
deciding in particular cases who actually is the
prevailing party.' " Occidental, 791 P.2d at 221.
(citation omitted).
K 16 The plaintiffs in Occidental claimed a balance
due of over $600,000.00 resulting from a trustee sale.
See id. The defendants asserted that the sale was
valid but stipulated *96 to a $7,300.00 deficiency
notwithstanding the sale. See id.
As a result,
plaintiffs obtained a judgment of approximately
$7,300.00 and argued that they should therefore be
deemed the prevailing party and thus be entitled to
attorney fees. Defendants argued that they should be
the prevailing party because they had successfully
defended against plaintiffs claim for $600,000.00, and
the court agreed. See id. at 222. Using a "flexible
and reasoned approach" the court determined that,
regardless of having prevailed on this issue, obtaining
a judgment for a small fraction of the amount sought
was not enough to warrant a recovery of attorney
fees. Id.
K 17 In the case at hand, the trial court applied this
line of reasoning and made its determination based
upon the following calculations:
The [c]ourt now turns to the Thayne's canyon
property. As to the contract claims only, the [cjourt
at trial awarded plaintiff $32,646.00, which included
the following:
1. Water and sewer laterals from curb to house
$ 3,200.00
2.
offset)

Plumbing ($14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for
$12,158.00

3. Gas line
1,015.00

$

4. Backhoe
100.00

$

5. Water and sewer laterals from the street to
curb
$ 7,000.00
6.
HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less
$3,092.00 to finish $9,173.00
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TOTAL:
$32,646.00
AMOUNT
- $17,000.00

PAID

Offset for
- $ 7,000.00

damages

BY
on

DEFENDANTS:
deficient

work

TOTAL:
$
8,646.00
Less contract price per Court of Appeals
-$9,173.00
GRAND
($ 527.00)

TOTAL:

Under a strict application of the "Net Recovery
Rule"
defendant would be the prevailing party on the
Thayne's
canyon property.
1f 18 The facts and circumstances surrounding a
determination of prevailing party status vary widely.
Because of those variances, we believe it entirely
appropriate, when adequately supported by the facts,
to conclude, as the trial court did here, that there is
no prevailing party.
[8] H 19 This case, like Occidental, dealt with sums
far in excess of Aspen's recovery of only $527.00. A
key part of the flexible approach to deciding who
actually is the prevailing party is common sense.
This includes looking at the amounts actually sought
and then balancing them proportionally with what was
recovered. See Stichting Mayflower v. Newpark Res.,
917 F.2d 1239, 1248 n. 9 (10th Cir.1990) ("[W]e
think the district court should attempt to weigh the
relative success of the parties!'] ... claims if it can
find a reasoned basis for doing so.").
U 20 Regarding the Thayne's Canyon Property, the
facts are undisputed.
Whipple sought roughly
$13,000.00 (allowing for the $17,000.00 already
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paid), and Aspen was claiming $25,000.00 in
damages for negligence by Whipple. The court
determined that "where the net recovery is only
$527.00, ... this is essentially a 'draw,' " in effect,
determining there was no prevailing party. In making
this determination the court looked to the language in
Occidental, and noted that "[c]ourts in our state have
acknowledged that the 'net recovery rule' is
essentially a starting point and need not be applied
strictly under all circumstances." 791 P.2d at 221.
In addition, the trial court weighed the relative
success of the parties' claims, reasoning: 1) Aspen
had barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action
involving the Thayne's Canyon property; 2) Aspen
"prevailed on an essentially legal issue;" and 3)
Aspen "should have allocated attorney fees [between]
the mechanics!'] lien claim of [Whipple] and the time
expended litigating the Licensure issues but has failed
to do so."
CONCLUSION
f 21 We hold that, for the purpose of obtaining
entitlement to attorney fees under the provisions of
section 38-1-18, the term "successful party" therein is
synonymous with the term "prevailing party."
Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied
"prevailing party" analysis to the undisputed facts of
*97. this case and appropriately determined that there
was no "prevailing party." Therefore, we affirm the
trial court's determination that neither party was
entitled to an award of attorney fees on the Thayne's
Canyon claim.
H 22 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
(FN1.) A detailed summary of the underlying facts in
this case is set forth in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing
& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, 977
V.2&51Z (Whipple I).
(FN2.) The three lien foreclosure actions, which
were consolidated for purposes of trial, are
referenced herein as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien;
(2) the Tom Guy Poolhouse lien; and (3) the
Thayne's Canyon property lien.
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This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B.
Wall of WALL 8c WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Defendants were

present and represented by their attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of
PRESTON Sc CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah.

The Court after receiving and

reviewing all evidence and having considered argument of the
parties the court entered it's Findings of Fact and Judgment
whereupon Defendant appealed said Findings of Fact and Judgment and
the Court of Appeals having rendered it's decision on said appeal
and having remanded the matter back to the trial court to amend
it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in
conformity with it's decision, now, therefore, by reason of the law
with it's opinion and findings aforesaid:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Plaintiff have and recover judgment jointly and

severally against Defendants Aspen Construction and Diane M. Quinn
in the sum of $3,465.10 with interest thereon from August 4, 1993
until the date hereof at the rate of ten (10)% per annum thereafter
said judgment is to bear interest at the legal rate of 7.45% per
annum until paid in full together with such other costs and
additional attorney's fees as may be awarded by the court.
2.

That the Plaintiff have and recover judgment jointly and

severally against Defendants Aspen Construction, Thomas D. Guy and
lf,,t
TORNDSATLAW

Claire B. Guv in the sum of $4,496.10 with interest thereon from
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July 28, 1993, until the date hereof at the rate of ten (10)% per
annum thereafter said judgment is to bear interest at the legal
rate of 7.45% until paid in full together with such other costs and
additional attorney's fees as may be awarded by the court.
3.

That the sums so due and owing to said Plaintiff is for

work and labor done and performed and for materials furnished upon,
in, and about the construction and improvement of the premises
hereinafter described; and that said premises and the interest of
the

respective

Defendants

therein,

are

junior,

inferior

and

subordinate to the lien or liens of the Plaintiff for the amount of
lien or liens together with costs and attorney's fees as set forth
herein.
4.

That pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-1-5 Plaintiff's

liens have priority over any liens, interests, mortgages or other
encumbrances which may have been filed or which may have attached
subsequent to the time when first work began, or first material was
furnished by Plaintiff and hereinvolved; alsc over any interests,
liens, mortgages cr other encumbrance of which any lien holder had
no notice and which was unrecorded at the cirrte work began, or first
materials furnished by Plaintiff on the subject land.
5.

That the interests of Defendant: Aspen Construction and

Diane Quinn in the property more particularly described below in
this paragraph, be sold by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of
Utah, in the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy the amount of
Plaintiff's lien against said property together with other expenses
HORNETS AT LAW
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and costs adjudged herein to be $3,465.10 plus interest thereon at
the rate of 10% per annum until the date hereof and thereafter at
the rate of 7.45% per annum until paid in full.
a.

6.

That

All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah,
situate in Summit County, Utah.
the interest of Defendants Aspen Construction,

Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy in the property more particularly
described in this paragraph be sold by the Sheriff of Summit
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy
the amount of Plaintiff's lien against said property together with
other expenses and costs adjudged herein to be $4,49 6.10 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum until the date hereof
and thereafter at the rate of 7.45% per annum until paid in full.
a.

7.

All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER VALLEY,
according to the official plat thereof as filed in
the Office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville
City, Utah, situate in Summit County, Utah.

That after che time allowed for redemption has expired,

as specified in Utah Code Annotated §38-1-15 the Sheriff shall
execute a deed to the purchaser or purchasers of the respective
premises on said sale or sales.
8.

That the proceeds of the respective sale or sales shall

be applied:
a.

To the payment of the sheriff's fees, disbursements,

and commissions on each respective sale;
b.
U&V\AIUAPC|

To the oavment to Plaintiff of the total sum due for
"

"
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principal, interest, and costs of suit.
9.

That if the proceeds of any sale be insufficient to pay

the amount so found to be due Plaintiff, with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale from any of these Defendants, the Sheriff shall,
in his return on the sale, specify separately as to each property
the amount of any such deficiency, and on filing said return, the
clerk of this court shall docket a judgment in favor of Plaintiff
for said deficiency against any of these Defendants where a
deficiency results.

Said judgment shall be in the amount of such

deficiency, and Plaintiff shall have execution therefor.
10.

That Defendants, and all persons claiming by, through or

under them, and all persons having liens subsequent and inferior to
Plaintiff's liens, and all persons claiming to have acquired any
estate or interest in said premises subsequent to Plaintiff's lien
shall

be

forever

barred and

foreclosed

from

all

equity

of

redemption in and tc said premises, and every part and parcel
thereof, from and after the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff of
Summit County, Utah.
11.

That Defendant Aspen Construction is awarded judgment

against Plaintiff A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating in the
amount o f $527 . 0 0 .
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This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B.
Wall of WALL Sc WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Defendants were

present and represented by their attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of
PRESTON Sc CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah.

The Court after receiving and

reviewing all evidence and having considered argument of the
parties the court entered it's Findings of Fact and Judgment
whereupon Defendant appealed said Findings of Fact and Judgment and
the Court of Appeals having rendered it's decision on said appeal
and having remanded the matter back to the trial court to amend
it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in
conformity with it's decision, the Court now hereby enters its
formal Amended Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This case represents three consolidated

cases which

includes two Circuit Court matters which were consolidated with the
District Court matter for trial.
2.

That Plaintiff A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating

Incorporated was at all times material to the various causes of
action enumerated in these consolidated cases a Utah corporation
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah and that said Plaintiff is licensed with the State of Utah as
a general plumbing contractor.
3.
.&WALUAPC]
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That

the

Defendant

Aspen
c

Construction

is

a

Utah

3
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County and is licensed with the State of Utah as a general building
contractor with an aggregate bid limit of $500,000.00.
4.

That Defendants Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy are

individuals and residents of Summit County, State of Utah and fee
title owners of the property identified as follows:
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER
VALLEY, according to the official plat
thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
Also, Defendant Thomas D. Guy is the fee title owner of the
property identified as follows:
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8
according to the official plat thereof as filed
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder,
Coalville City, Utah.
5.

That Defendant Diane M. Quinn is an individual and

resident of Summit County, State of Utah and fee title owner of the
orooertv identified as follows:
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
6.

Sometime in the early part of 1993, the Plaintiff, by and

through its agent Bill Fenstermaker entered into several agreements
with Defendant Aspen Construction to perform work on the three
properties which are the subject of these consolidated actions.
Those various contracts consisted of the relocation of a Park City
water line at 77 Thavnes Canvon; the installation of a gas line at
U&v\AlUAPCi
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-
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the Diane Quinn property; miscellaneous plumbing work at the Thomas
Guy poolhouse; installation of a forced air heating system at 77
Thaynes Canyon Drive; the installation of a gas line at 77 Thaynes
Canyon Drive; the installation of the rough, subrough and finished
plumbing at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive.

The installation of a hose

bib at the Thomas Guy poolhouse; the installation of the sewer and
water laterals from the street to the curb at 77 Thaynes Canyon
Drive and 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive; the installation of the sewer
and water lateral from the curb to the house at 77 Thaynes Canyon
Drive. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant Aspen Construction
utilized a backhoe which was rented by the Plaintiff and which was
at the 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive property for work unrelated to any
of the aforementioned contracts.
7.

That prior to the trial of this matter the Court ruled

Plaintiff could not recover under its contract with Defendant Aspen
Construction for the heating system installed at 77 Thaynes Canyon
Drive

since

it

was

not

a

licensed

HVAC

contractor

however,

Plaintiff could recover on an equitable basis and Plaintiff should
be compensated for any benefit conferred on the property by the
installation of said heating system less any deductions to complete
the installation and to correct any deficiencies in the system.
8.

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff

was denied any recovery for the HVAC system installed at 77 Thaynes
Canyon Property and was not entitled to be compensated based upon
any benefit it mav have conferred on the property by virtue of the
EORNEYSATLAVV
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installation of the HVAC system.
9.

That

pursuant

to

agreement

with

Defendant

Aspen

Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at the property of
Defendant

Diane

Quinn

which

is

more

particularly

described

hereafter, in the amount of $631.00, The work was completed by the
Plaintiff in a satisfactory manner and Defendant Aspen Construction
has failed to pay Plaintiff for said work.
10.

That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in

the amount of $631.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1993 as
Entry No. 387098 in Book 751 at Page 364 of the official records of
the Summit County Recorder on the property owned by Defendant Diane
Quinn and more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
11.

That pursuant

to oral agreement with Defendant Aspen

Construction Plaintiff performed miscellaneous plumbing work at
Lots 52 and 53 at the Oaks at Deer Valley which property is more
particularly described hereafter and which is owned by Defendants
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy.

The work was completed in a

satisfactory manner and the value of said work is $1,666.00 which
Defendant Aspen Construction has failed to pay to the Plaintiff.
12.

That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in

the amounc of $1,666.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1992 as
Entry No. 387096 in Book 751 at Page 00362 of the official records
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of the Summit County Recorder on the property owned by Defendants
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy and more particularly described as
follows:
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER
VALLEY, according to the official plat
thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
13.

That

pursuant

to

oral

agreement

with

the

Plaintiff

Defendant Aspen Construction utilized Plaintiff's backhoe for work
at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive which was not contemplated by any other
agreements entered into between Defendant Aspen Construction and
the

Plaintiff

for

work

done

on

the

subject

property.

The

reasonable value of such work is $100.00 which Defendant Aspen
Construction has failed to pay the Plaintiff.
14.

That

Defendant

pursuant

Aspen

to

written

Construction

and

Plaintiff

oral

agreements

installed

the

with
rough,

subrcugh, and finish plumbing at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive which work
was completed

satisfactorily up to a point when Plaintiff was

terminated from the job. The original contract was $13,000.00 plus
exiras which the parties contracted for in the amount of $1,158.00.
The cost to complete the remaining work under the contract is
$2,OCC.OO.
15.

The heating system installed at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive

has some deficiencies more particularly leakage and poor air flow
to one bedroom as well as no duct or ducts to a portion of the
basement in the area of the wet bar.

Defendants have failed to
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show by a preponderance of evidence that it is necessary to
completely remove the existing system and install a new system.
More particularly,
preponderance

of

Defendants have
evidence

that

the

failed

to establish by a

three

furnaces

currently

installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of said
furnaces is improperly sized and the testimony of Defendant's
expert to the contrary is vague at best. The type and size of the
ducting

to

the

furnaces

meets

the

Uniform

Mechanical

Code

requirements and no higher requirements or standard was contracted
for by the parties.
Many of the problems which exist with the present system can
be corrected with further adjustments and fine tuning of the system
such as complete installation of the thermostats as designed by the
Plaintiff

and

connecting

and operation

of

the

zone dampers.

However, in order to correct these deficiencies it will cost
Defendant Aspen the sum of $7,000.00.
16.

That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant: Aspen

Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at 77 Thaynes Canyon
Drive for the sum of $1,015.00.
17.

That pursuant to an oral agreement with Defendant Aspen

Construction Plaintiff installed a sewer and water lateral from the
curb to the house at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive.

This contract was

entered into separate and apart from any other contracts pertaining
to installation of any other portion of the sewer and water
laterals to said property or the contract relating to the rough,
'RN£YbATLAV\
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subrough and finished plumbing of said property.

The agreement

entered into by the parties and the reasonable value for said work
is $3,200.00 for which Plaintiff has not been paid.

Defendants did

not

cost

present

evidence

which

controverted

the

of

the

installation of the water and sewer laterals from the street to the
curb at 77 or 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive in the amount of $7,000.00.
18.

That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in

the amount of $30,647.20 was timely filed on September 14, 1993, as
Entry No. 387097 in Book 751 at Page 363 on the property identified
as 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive and which is more particularly described
as follows:
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8
according to the official plat thereof as filed
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder,
Coalville City, Utah.
19.

That Defendant Aspen Construction has paid to date the

sum of $17,000.00 towards the aforementioned amounts and after
crediting said payments to the total contracts identified herein
and after deducting the cost for the KVAC system Plaintiff owes
Defendant Aspen Construction the amount of $527.00.
20.
their

That neither party has clearly prevailed with respect to

various

claims

related

to

77

Thaynes

Canyon

Property

therefore, neither party is awarded their attorney's fees or costs
as to this action.

However, Plaintiff has clearly prevailed on

it's claims related to the Diane Quinn Property and Thomas D. and
Claire 3. Guy Property therefore, the court awards Plaintiff it's

9
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00 for the claim related to
the Diane Quinn property and $2,000.00 for the claim related to the
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy property which amounts -are to be
taxed as costs plus it's costs incurred and related to these two
causes.
1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for the

installation of the gas line at the property of Defendant Diane
Quinn in the amount of $631.00.
2.

That the mechanic's lien filed on the property identified

as the Diane Quinn property and more particularly described as
follows:
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of
$631.00 plus $2,834.10 in costs and interest thereon at the rate of
10% per annum from Augusc 4, 1993, to the date of entry of Amended
Judgment, thereafter interest at the rate of 7.45% per annum until
paid in full together with any other costs and fees which may be
awarded by the court and that the interests of Defendants Aspen
Construction and

Diane M. Quinn are decreed junior, inferior and

subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff and that said lien may
be foreclosed by the sale of said property by the Summit County
Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by this Court and that
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from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to recover the amount
of* said lien together with the costs related to the sale of said
property and interest which has accrued since the date of work
completion, to-wit: August 4, 1993. In the event there results a
deficiency after applying all amounts from said sale to the amount
due and owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is to be awarded a judgment
jointly and severally against Defendants Diane Quinn and Aspen
Construction for any such deficiency.
3.

That

a valid and enforceable agreement

existed for

various miscellaneous plumbing work performed at the Thomas D. Guy
and Claire B. Guy property identified as Lots 52 and 53 at the Oaks
at Deer Valley in the amount of $1,666.00.
4.

That the mechanic's lien filed on the property identified

as the Thomas Guy poolhouse more particularly described as follows:
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER
VALLEY, according to the official plat
thereof as filed in the Office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City,
Utah.
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of
$1,666.00, plus $2,830.10, in coses and interest thereon at the
rate of 10% per annum from July 28, 1993, to the date of entry of
the Amended Judgment thereafter at the rate of 7.45% per annum
until paid in full cogether with any other costs and fees which may
be awarded by the court and that the interests of the Defendants
Asoen Construction, Thomas D. Guv and Claire 3. Guv are decreed
Aa\ALUAPC*
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junior, inferior and subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff
and that said lien may be foreclosed by the sale of said property
by the Summit County Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by
this Court and from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to
recover the amount of said lien together with the costs related to
the sale of said property.

In the event any deficiency results

after applying all amounts from said sale to the amount due and
owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is to be awarded a judgment jointly
and severally against Defendants Aspen Construction, Thomas D. Guy
and Claire B. Guy for any such deficiency.
5.

Valid

and

enforceable

agreements

existed

for

the

installation of the water and sewer lateral from the curb to the
house

in

the

amount

of $3,200.00; installation

of

the rough,

subrough and finished plumbing including extras in the amount of
$14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for offsets to finish said plumbing; the
installation of a gas line in the amount of $1,015.00; use of a
backhoe in the amount of $100.0C at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive. Also,
a valid agreement existed for the installation of the sewer and
water

laterals

from the street to the curb at Lots 77 and 79

Thaynes Canyon Drive in the amount of $7,000.00 which Defendants
did not contest at the time of trial. Defendant Aspen Construction
is entitled to an offset of such amounts due* Plaintiff for the
aforementioned work in the amount of $7,000.00

to correct

the

deficiencies in the HVAC system as more fully identified in the
Findings of Fact and $17,000.00 in oavments made by Defendant Aspen
I70RNEYS AT LAW
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Construction for work performed at the 77 Thaynes Canyon Property
thereby resulting in a net amount due Defendant Aspen Construction
by A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating of $527.00.
6.

Neither party is to be awarded their attorney's fees or

costs related to the claims of 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive.
DATED this

day of

C^y C A

2000

BY THE COURT:
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